Modelling Flexible Social Commitments and Their Enforcement

Pasquier, Philippe; Flores, Roberto A.; Chaib-draa, Brahim

doi:10.1007/11423355_10

Cited by 30 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Directed social commitments are modeled in [13], in the context of dialogical frameworks. Violated commitments resort to their cancellation, which may bring sanctions.…”

Section: Reasoning With Timementioning

confidence: 99%

Directed Deadline Obligations in Agent-Based Business Contracts

Cardoso

Oliveira

2010

Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems V

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Abstract. There are B2B relationships that presume cooperation in contract enactment. This issue should be taken into account when modeling, for computational handling, contractual commitments through obligations. Deadline obligations have been modeled by considering that reaching the deadline without compliance brings up a violation. When modeling commitments in business contracts, directed obligations have been studied for identifying two agents: the obligation's bearer and the counterparty, who may claim for legal action in case of non-compliance. We argue in favor of a directed deadline obligation approach, taking inspiration on international legislation over trade procedures. Our proposal to model contractual obligations is based on authorizations granted in specific states of an obligation lifecycle model, which we formalize using temporal logic and implement in a rule-based system. The performance of a contractual relationship is supported by a model of flexible deadlines, which allow for further cooperation between autonomous agents. As a result, the decision-making space of agents concerning contractual obligations is enlarged and becomes richer. We discuss the issues that agents should take into account in this extended setting.

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“…Directed social commitments are modeled in [13], in the context of dialogical frameworks. Violated commitments resort to their cancellation, which may bring sanctions.…”

Section: Reasoning With Timementioning

confidence: 99%

Directed Deadline Obligations in Agent-Based Business Contracts

Cardoso

Oliveira

2010

Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems V

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“…So the use of social commitments to model the effects of communication relies on the notion of obligation to explain how commitments affect the behavior of the individual agents. As it appears, commitments require enforcement mechanisms of obligations, like sanctions (Pasquier et al, 2004). This makes sense for competitive environments, like argumentation dialogue or negotiation, but it does not make sense in cooperative environments, like information seeking or inquiry, where a commitment can simply be interpreted as an expectation.…”

Section: Social Commitments: Action Commitment In Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Replanning Algorithm for Decision Theoretic Hierarchical Planning: Principles and Empirical Evaluation

Boella

Damiano

2008

Applied Artificial Intelligence

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In this paper, we present a replanning algorithm for a decision-theoretic hierarchical planner, and illustrate the experimental methodology we designed to investigate its performance. The methodology relies on an agentbased framework, in which plan failures emerge from the interplay of the agent and the environment. Given this framework, the replanning algorithm is compared with planning from scratch by executing experiments in different domains. The empirical evaluation shows the superiority of replanning with respect from planning from scratch. However, the observation of significant differences in the data collected across planning domains confirm the importance of empirical evaluation in practical systems.

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“…[7,8]) we find, among others, two basic kinds of sanctions that an institution may apply in order to incentive norm compliance (or, to put it another way, to discourage deviations). Direct material sanctions have an immediate effect, and consist of affecting the resources an agent has (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%