Models and mechanisms in psychological explanation

Abstract

Mechanistic explanation has an impressive track record of advancing our understanding of complex, hierarchically organized physical systems, particularly biological and neural systems. But not every complex system can be understood mechanistically. Psychological capacities are often understood by providing cognitive models of the systems that underlie them. I argue that these models, while superficially similar to mechanistic models, in fact have a substantially more complex relation to the real underlying system. They are typically constructed using a range of techniques for abstracting the functional properties of the system, which may not coincide with its mechanistic organization. I describe these techniques and show that despite being non-mechanistic, these cognitive models can satisfy the normative constraints on good explanations.

Models, Mechanisms, and Coherence

“…We agree with Weiskopf ([2011]) that, although terminologically it might sound more natural to say that a howactually model is just the true or accurate model of its target mechanism, it is plausible that the distinction between how-possibly and how-actually models is in fact an epistemic one that turns on degrees of evidential support. To begin with, Machamer et al ([2000], p. 21) frame the distinction in epistemic terms, in reference to the intelligibility bestowed by a mechanistic explanation upon the phenomenon it purports to explain.…”

“…Accordingly, even if a model is in fact a true or accurate representation of its target mechanism, if we lack evidence in its favour, then it is a how-possibly model. Third, as argued by Weiskopf ([2011]), if the distinction were in terms of truth, then it would make little sense to say that a howpossibly model can turn out to be a how-actually model. But, in fact, 'any one of a set of how-possibly models might turn out to accurately model the system, so the difference in how they are placed along this dimension cannot just be in terms of accuracy.…”

Fiction As a Vehicle for Truth: Moving Beyond the Ontic Conception

“…Moreover, in many cases, these fictions seem to play an explanatory role (e.g., Batterman 2009;Bokulich 2008aBokulich , 2008bBokulich , 2009Bokulich , 2012Weiskopf 2011). This use of fictional posits in scientific explanation runs counter to the received view of scientific explanation, according to which only true accounts and existing entities, processes, etc.…”

Kant’s Emergence and Sellarsian Cognitive Science

“…One of the key problems for CTM is that mental representations must have (broadly speaking) "semantic" properties, but no one has shown how they can possess such properties (Fodor, 1987, xi). Against this background, rehearsing the slogans of an antiquated "mechanistic imperialism" (Weiskopf, 2011) (Sellars, Roy, 1970), favored an emergentist approach. Thus, a sophisticated emergentist position akin, in many other respects, to CS is already present in the Wilfrid Sellars' philosophy of mind.…”