Models and Representation

Abstract

A general account of modeling in physics is proposed. Modeling is shown to involve three components: denotation, demonstration, and interpretation. Elements of the physical world are denoted by elements of the model; the model possesses an internal dynamic that allows us to demonstrate theoretical conclusions; these in turn need to be interpreted if we are to make predictions. The DDI account can be readily extended in ways that correspond to different aspects of scientific practice.

Missing systems and the face value practice

“…Weisberg, on the other hand, does not seem to face these difficulties, despite the fact that he and Godfrey-Smith are arguing for a similar distinction amongst representational strategies; for Weisberg, the intermediate entities employed in modelling are "abstract, mathematical models" (2007, p. 217), and he claims only that the relations between such models and real systems "can…loosely be described as relations of similarity" (ibid., p. 221). 41 If we say, as we might, that the mathematical properties possessed by the mathematical structure denote the physical properties to which they have been made to correspond, then we have here the "D" part of R. I. G. Hughes's (1997) "DDI" account, applied to mathematical structures. It seems plausible to assume that Hughes himself intends his account to apply to representation by mathematical structures, given his initial discussion of Galileo's use of geometrical structures to represent motions (ibid., section 2).…”

Models as Make-Believe

“…Moreover, in many of the cases we have considered, agents do not even believe that they are 39 Hughes (1997), S330-1 40 Goodman (1976), p26 41 This example reminds us that the same prepared description and equation of motion may serve very different representational functions. 42 Callender and Cohen (2006), p81 n11 representing an actual object.…”

“…However, Suárez argues that this account can accommodate what he calls 'fictional representation, that is, representations of nonexisting entities', and in fact, he claims that on his account 'there is absolutely no difference in kind between fictional and real-object representation -other than the existence or otherwise of the target'. 50 model; the model possesses an internal dynamic that allows us to demonstrate theoretical conclusions; these in turn need to be interpreted if we are to make predictions' (Hughes (1997) How is this supposed to work? Consider an ether model.…”

“…Versions of this point may be found in Frigg (2006), Hughes (1997) and Suárez (2003), although each draw rather different lessons from it. 6 Callender and Cohen (2006), p68.…”

Scientific Representations as Limiting Cases

“…In recent years there has been a growing literature which endeavours to address the constitution problem of scientific representation (for instance, Callender and Craig 2006, Contessa 2007, French 2003, Frigg 2006, Giere 2004and 2010, Hughes 1997, Suárez 2003. In this paper, I pave the way for a new proposal: the limiting case account of scientific representation, which will be spelled out in section 5.…”