Models as Make-Believe

Abstract

In this paper I propose an account of representation for scientific models based on Kendall Walton's 'make-believe' theory of representation in art. I first set out the problem of scientific representation and respond to a recent argument due to Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen, which aims to show that the problem may be easily dismissed. I then introduce my account of models as props in games of make-believe and show how it offers a solution to the problem. Finally, I demonstrate an important advantage my account has over other theories of scientific representation. All existing theories analyse scientific representation in terms of relations, such as similarity or denotation. By contrast, my account does not take representation in modelling to be essentially relational. For this reason, it can accommodate a group of models often ignored in discussions of scientific representation, namely models which are representational but which represent no actual object.

True Griceanism: Filling the Gaps in Callender and Cohen’s Account of Scientific Representation

“…Liu actually provides some insights that could be relevant for such a derivation, such as the fact that epistemic representations use symbols. Toon (2010) makes a similar point, observing that Callender and Cohen's reduction of representation to mental states takes a very simple form. More sophisticated accounts could be proposed (and Toon's "models as make-believe" purports to be such a proposal).…”

“…Callender and Cohen's approach has been criticized by many authors (Toon 2010;Bueno and French 2011;Peschard 2011;Ducheyne 2012;Frigg and Nguyen 2017). In this article, I focus on two main criticisms, which are to my knowledge the most developed in the literature and which happen to be complementary: Liu (2015) and Boesch (2017).…”

The Fiction View of Models Reloaded

“…This is the project of Toon (2010; and Levy (2012;2015). Toon Toon and Levy articulate this basic idea within the framework of Walton's (1990) theory of make-believe (MB).…”

The ontology of theoretical modelling: models as make-believe

“…15 Toon (2009Toon ( , 2010 whether they are themselves fictional entities. In the case we are considering, even if we take our model to be a fictional idealised oscillator that satisfies our prepared description and equation of motion, we are still left with the problem of saying what this fictional oscillator represents.…”