The ontology of theoretical modelling: models as make-believe

Toon, Adam

doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9508-x

Cited by 55 publications

(25 citation statements)

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“…These observations suggest that models -at least some models, those that contain idealization, perhaps -bear important similarities to fictions. Indeed several recent authors have argued that modeling is a species of fiction-making (Godfey-Smith, 2006Frigg, 2010;Toon, 2010). I too find this suggestion attractive (although in a somewhat qualified form -see Levy, forthcoming).…”

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confidence: 85%

Models, Fictions, and Realism: Two Packages

Levy¹

2012

Philos. of Sci.

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Some philosophers of science -the present author included -appeal to fiction as an interpretation of the practice of modeling. This raises the specter of an incompatibility with realism, since fictionmaking is essentially non-truth-regulated. I argue that the prima facie conflict can be resolved in two ways, each involving a distinct notion of fiction and a corresponding formulation of realism. The main goal of the paper is to describe these two packages. Toward the end I comment on how to choose among them. IntroductionSometimes philosophers of science appeal to fiction by way of dismissal: misguided theoretical efforts -the positing of ether, epicycles, gemmules -are seen as "merely fictional", mistakes which serve, at best, as stepping stones on the way to better science. But recent discussion has increasingly included an interpretive appeal to fiction. Here the idea is that certain aspects of theoretical science, especially modeling, can be illuminated by drawing an analogy to works of art such as novels and feature films. My interest here is in this interpretive project -specifically in its compatibility with some form of scientific realism. Viewing models as fictional implies that they are often untrue. More importantly, it means that they are, at least in the first instance, not regulated by truth. This implies that in order to hold on to realism we need to locate a locus of truth in modeling that is different than the models themselves, yet permits a stance that is appropriately thought of as realism about the fruits of 1 For oral and written comments I am indebted to Mauricio Suarez and Martin modeling. I will argue that this can be had, if both realism and "fictionalism" 2 are given the right formulation. Indeed, I will argue that there are two possible fictionalism-plus-realism packages. I'll mainly describe these packages, but toward the end I discuss reasons for choosing among them. Setting up the ProblemLet me start by motivating the interpretive appeal to fictions, via an example drawn from recent theoretical work on the onset of cancer. Cancer often arises in small compartments within a tissue -e.g. so-called "crypts" in the colon. An important theoretical question is whether the architecture of such compartments affects the likelihood of cancer. The so-called "linear process model" represents one attempt to address this question (see Figure 1). In this model a compartment is described as a production line of sorts, in which cells "pop in" at one end and leave (i.e. die) at the other end. Martin Nowak and colleagues have shown that this kind of architecture substantially reduces the likelihood of cancer (Nowak et. al, 2003). These observations suggest that models -at least some models, those that contain idealization, perhaps -bear important similarities to fictions. Indeed several recent authors have argued that modeling is a species of fiction-making (Godfey-Smith, 2006Frigg, 2010;Toon, 2010). I too find this suggestion attractive (although in a somewhat qualified form -see Levy, forth...

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confidence: 85%

Models, Fictions, and Realism: Two Packages

Levy¹

2012

Philos. of Sci.

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“…Some will object to this comparison. Surely there are many differences 36 Toon (2010) between our model of the bouncing spring and works of fiction such as War of the Worlds, or between an architect's scale model and a statue of Napoleon? Although I claim that models employ the same form of representation that Walton ascribes to works of fiction, I do not deny that there are many important differences between the two, as there are amongst works of fiction themselves.…”

Section: (V) Models and Work Of Fictionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…43 For now, we may simply note that the ontology of theoretical models themselves is not the problem that concerns us here. We want to know how our 43 Toon (2010) account of representation can accommodate models without actual objects. It is possible for these two problems to become confused.…”

Section: Models Without Actual Objects (I)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent case studies suggest scientists must often go beyond existing theory to model a system; for example, see Morgan and Morrison (1999). 3 For my own view of the ontology of theoretical modelling, see Toon (2010). write down, but some form of abstract entity that they define. Giere offers an indirect, two-stage, view of theoretical modelling: First, prepared descriptions and theoretical laws define abstract objects.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Rather, they prescribe us to imagine propositions about the actual bouncing spring: we imagine of the actual bob that it is a point mass and of the actual spring that it is massless, and so on. 33 For more on the ontology of theoretical modelling, see Toon (2010). 34 The suggestion that models might be understood as fictional entities is found in Godfrey-Smith (2006) and Frigg (2006b).…”

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Models as Make-Believe

Toon¹

2010

Beyond Mimesis and Convention

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In this paper I propose an account of representation for scientific models based on Kendall Walton's 'make-believe' theory of representation in art. I first set out the problem of scientific representation and respond to a recent argument due to Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen, which aims to show that the problem may be easily dismissed. I then introduce my account of models as props in games of make-believe and show how it offers a solution to the problem. Finally, I demonstrate an important advantage my account has over other theories of scientific representation. All existing theories analyse scientific representation in terms of relations, such as similarity or denotation. By contrast, my account does not take representation in modelling to be essentially relational. For this reason, it can accommodate a group of models often ignored in discussions of scientific representation, namely models which are representational but which represent no actual object.

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Mechanism Models as Necessary Truths

Johansson

2019

Mario Bunge: A Centenary Festschrift

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The ontology of theoretical modelling: models as make-believe

Cited by 55 publications

References 9 publications

Models, Fictions, and Realism: Two Packages

Models, Fictions, and Realism: Two Packages

Models as Make-Believe

Mechanism Models as Necessary Truths

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