Models of conflict, negotiation and third party intervention: A review and synthesis

Lewicki, Roy J.; Weiss, Stephen E.; Lewin, David

doi:10.1002/job.4030130303

Cited by 254 publications

(200 citation statements)

References 92 publications

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“…The history of third-party intervention in conflict is as long as the history of human conflict precisely because third parties have proved useful in curbing violence and destruction, to everyone's benefit (7). Others before us have studied how mediators, arbitrators, and norm enforcers shape social interactions (12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research to explore when, why, and how self-interested third parties transform competition into cooperation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Such models are ill-equipped to consider the critical role that third parties play in shaping the process and outcomes of conflict. Scientific investigations that broaden the focus to consider also the role of third parties in conflict usually focus on the actions of formal role holders such as mediators or arbitrators (12)(13)(14). Mediators are invited by the disputants to manage the process of conflict; arbitrators' formal role requires that they determine the conflict's outcome.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Selfish third parties act as peacemakers by transforming conflicts and promoting cooperation

Halevy

Halali

2015

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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The tremendous costs of conflict have made humans resourceful not only at warfare but also at peacemaking. Although third parties have acted as peacemakers since the dawn of history, little is known about voluntary, informal third-party intervention in conflict. Here we introduce the Peacemaker Game, a novel experimental paradigm, to model and study the interdependence between disputants and third parties in conflict. In the game, two disputants choose whether to cooperate or compete and a third party chooses whether or not to intervene in the conflict. Intervention introduces side payments that transform the game disputants are playing; it also introduces risk for the third party by making it vulnerable to disputants' choices. Six experiments revealed three robust effects: (i) The mere possibility of third-party intervention significantly increases cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup conflicts; (ii) reducing the risk to third parties dramatically increases intervention rates, to everyone's benefit; and (iii) disputants' cooperation rates are consistently higher than third parties' intervention rates. These findings explain why, how, and when self-interested third parties facilitate peaceful conflict resolution.conflict | dispute resolution | war and peace | incentives | social dilemma "The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker."Richard Nixon,

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Selfish third parties act as peacemakers by transforming conflicts and promoting cooperation

Halevy

Halali

2015

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…Most academic and non-academic literature shows a bias towards the integrative strategy [17], because of two main reasons: (1) it represents a zero-sum solution, since the gains obtained by one party represent losses from the other; and (2) the fundamental values behind the integrative strategy -interpersonal trust, cooperation and search for mutually acceptable outcomes -are favoured by most scientists' value systems. We will also follow the policy of favouring the integrative strategy.…”

Section: Sqfd and Negotiation -Requirements Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Software Requirements Negotiation Using the Software Quality Function Deployment

Ramires¹,

Antunes²,

Respício

2005

Groupware: Design, Implementation, and Use

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Abstract. We propose a groupware tool supporting the Software Quality Function Deployment approach to software requirements validation. The design challenge is to involve several stakeholders, having conflicting views and attitudes which may be difficult to reconcile, in the requirements validation. The adopted approach integrates collaboration and negotiation support. Negotiation models inspired the development of a set of mechanisms promoting integrative attitudes and avoiding distributive ones. Experiments with the tool revealed some usability problems, but also showed that it is convenient to use and beneficial promoting consensus.

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“…This research has focused on the types of outcomes or agreements pursued (e.g., distributive vs. integrative), as well as the factors that might influence the achievement of those outcomes (styles, tactics, behaviors, etc.) (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000;Lewicki, Weiss, & Lewin, 1992;Tsay & Bazerman, 2009). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Power and Individualism-Collectivism on Negotiation Initiation

et al. 2016

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ResumoNegociação é um processo essencial na área de negócios e seu início pode afetar o desenrolar de todo o processo. Embora oportunidades possam ser perdidas quando uma ou mais partes fracassam no começo de uma negociação, essa fase tem sido pouco explorada pelas pesquisas até há bem pouco tempo. Este artigo relata os resultados de um estudo de negociações que examina os efeitos de fatores situacionais/contextuais e culturais no processo de iniciação (acionando a outra parte, fazendo uma solicitação, otimizando a solicitação), concentrando-se especificamente quanto ao poder relativo de barganha (fator situacional) e individualismo-coletivismo. Encontraram-se evidências de que um alto poder de barganha aumenta a probabilidade da intenção de iniciar uma negociação em geral, e, mais especificamente, de fazer uma solicitação e otimizar essa solicitação. Os fatores culturais individualismo e coletivismo também apresentaram evidências que afetam a iniciação de uma negociação: individualistas tiveram maior probabilidade de iniciar uma negociação que os coletivistas, sendo esse efeito aumentado para aqueles individualistas com alto poder relativo de barganha. As implicações práticas e teóricas dos resultados encontrados são discutidas e sugestões de pesquisas futuras são apresentadas.Palavras-chave: negociação; iniciação; poder; cultura; individualismo-coletivismo. AbstractNegotiation is an essential business process, with the initiation of a negotiation likely to affect how the process unfolds. Despite the fact that opportunities are often lost when one or more parties fail to initiate, initiation has until recently been overlooked in negotiation process models and research. This paper reports findings from a study that examines the effects situational/contextual factors and culture have on the initiation process (engaging a prospective counterpart, making a request, and optimizing that request), focusing specifically on relative bargaining power (a situational factor) and individualism-collectivism. Higher bargaining power was found to increase the likelihood of initiation intentionality in general as well as the requesting and optimizing phases more specifically. In addition, individualism/collectivism was also found to affect initiation, with individualists more likely than collectivists to initiate a negotiation. Further, this effect was enhanced when individualists had high relative bargaining power. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, with suggestions for future research.

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Models of conflict, negotiation and third party intervention: A review and synthesis

Cited by 254 publications

References 92 publications

Selfish third parties act as peacemakers by transforming conflicts and promoting cooperation

Selfish third parties act as peacemakers by transforming conflicts and promoting cooperation

Software Requirements Negotiation Using the Software Quality Function Deployment

The Influence of Power and Individualism-Collectivism on Negotiation Initiation

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