Moderation through exclusion? The journey of the Tunisian<i>Ennahda</i>from fundamentalist to conservative party

Cavatorta, Francesco; Merone, Fabio

doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.801255

Cited by 146 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Thus, post Ben Ali Tunisia would and should give the possibility to participate in the new order to all, including radical Islamists. Second, Ghannouchi believed that Tunisian society would change young Salafis and moderate their views, replicating what it had done in the past for al Nahda (Allani 2009;Cavatorta and Merone 2013). For Ghannouchi this was an admission of the emergence of a new Islamist trend, which al Nahda would have to contend with, and a statement of trust in the capacity of society to integrate radical young Salafis in the political project of a new Tunisia without resorting to repression.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Salafism, liberalism, and democratic learning in Tunisia

Cavatorta

2015

The Journal of North African Studies

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The article charts the rise of the jihadi Salafi movement in Tunisia during the transitional period and analyses the way in which the national attempt to construct a more liberal and democratic system influenced its internal dynamics and debate. It highlights in particular how democratic mechanisms and liberal norms being put in place in Tunisia impacted on the movement and how then this was reflected in its interactions with the other social and political actors in the system. The unique Tunisian environment in which democratic mechanisms and individual liberal freedoms were introduced immediately after the revolution led the jihadi Salafi movement to operate through contradictory behaviour and actions in a process of what can be called 'stop-start' democratic learning, which ultimately failed. The novelty of the political arrangements was beneficial to jihadi Salafism initially, as the new liberal environment allowed it to proselytise and organise in the open while railing against democracy and liberalism. In doing so they unwillingly contributed to strengthen the consensus of political actors on the necessity to build a democratic system. However, under the weight of this contradictory attitude, the movement ended up threatening the transition and failed to integrate.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Salafism, liberalism, and democratic learning in Tunisia

Cavatorta

2015

The Journal of North African Studies

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“…When one engages with literature that pertains to the recent political history of Tunisia, one can be sure to come across scholarly writings that discuss what has come to be referred to as the Collectif du 18 Octobre dialogue (hereafter referred to as the Collectif), initiated in 2005 (see e.g. Marzouki, 2017, Boubekeur, 2016, Cavatorta & Merone, 2013, Haugbolle & Cavatorta, 2011. The Collectif was a successful attempt of cross-party cooperation between political parties in opposition to the Ben-Ali regime.…”

Section: A History Of Dialogue a Prerequisite For Future Compromise?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating the Post-Revolution Constitution for Tunisia – Members of the National Constituent Assembly Share Their Experiences

Saati¹

2018

ILR

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Though the Tunisian transition to democracy faces challenges seven years following the 2011 revolution and four years following the enactment of the new constitution, the country still constitutes a ‘success story’, especially in comparison to neighbouring states that were also touched by the Arab Uprisings. This paper takes an interest in exploring the Tunisian constitution-making process, and especially the political elite negotiated compromises that took place in the National Constituent Assembly. How were Tunisian religious and secular political forces able to unite and compromise on a constitutional document; what motivated their actions during the constitutional talks? Ideologies, rational pragmatism, self-serving interests or something else? This is a pertinent question that has bearing for other states that are in transition from authoritarian rule, in which religious and secular political parties are struggling to draft the political rules of the game anew. This is a qualitative study, based on interviews with political representatives, from a broad range of Tunisian political parties, who were part of the constitutional negotiations. Their responses suggest that pragmatism and rationality took precedence over ideological positions during the negotiations, and that this was indispensable for a draft to be produced. Despite this, the study argues that ideologies were likely not irrelevant in the minds of the political elites who were negotiating the post-revolution constitution, and that previous agreements and discussions among these elites that were, in fact, based on ideological positions, facilitated the constitutional negotiations that took place in the aftermath of the ousting of Ben-Ali.

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“…23 The crackdown on Salafi associations by the technocratic government in early 2014, the replacement of Salafi imams and Nidaa Tounes' efforts to revive a folkloric Islam with the help of loyal state imams (whose discourse was unsatisfying to young people wanting Islam to play a role in politics) were beneficial to the return of Ennahda's networks within the mosques and its outreach to new conservative circles. Simultaneously managing the pursuit of its Islamic project and institutional representation has been at the core of Ennahda's search for its political identity (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). During the summer 2013 Bardo protests, Ennahda had opted for a small leadership circle to provide quick decision making in the form of a committee called Group 21 rather than broad consultations within party ranks.…”

Section: The Limits Of Consensus Politics and Bargained Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: bargained Competition

Boubekeur

2015

Mediterranean Politics

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The ousting of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011 raised hopes among Tunisians for better access to politics as well as a more equitable distribution of economic resources, but it also divided them concerning the kind of political order that should be established. On the one hand, revolutionaries from deprived interior regions as well as civil society activists and political parties of the radical Left pushed for a complete overhaul of the political system through a revolutionary constituent assembly and local representative councils involving citizens in a bottom-up process geared towards tackling such issues as health, education, redistribution of resources, abuses by the security forces, corruption and social justice. On the other hand, parties already involved in politics under Ben Ali focused on consolidating their presence on the political scene, maintaining or gaining access to state structures and the informal patronage networks that he had left behind. Maintaining the existing institutional framework and holding elections provided a legitimate avenue for the return to politics of representatives from Ben Ali's Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique (RCD)

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Moderation through exclusion? The journey of the TunisianEnnahdafrom fundamentalist to conservative party

Cited by 146 publications

References 31 publications

Salafism, liberalism, and democratic learning in Tunisia

Salafism, liberalism, and democratic learning in Tunisia

Negotiating the Post-Revolution Constitution for Tunisia – Members of the National Constituent Assembly Share Their Experiences

Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: bargained Competition

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