Molinism: Explaining our Freedom Away

Abstract

Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully explains both Eve’s action and everything else Eve does that influences that action; and that if this is the case, Eve does not act freely. The first premise of this argument follows from the explanatory relations the Molinist is committed to, and the second premise follows from libertarian intuitions about free will.

Defending the Free Will Defense: A Reply to Sterba

“…For critical discussions of P 2 , see Himma (2009) and Ekstrom (2021). For the suggestion that no one would be free if both Molinism and libertarianism were true-thus undermining any free will defense that presupposes both-see Climenhaga and Rubio (2022). 10 If Sterba actually intended to issue a challenge to P 3* , then I am at a loss for how that challenge could escape the charge of equivocation.…”