Molyneux' question redux

Molyneux’s Question in Berkeley’s Theory of Vision

“…I then deployed a notion of thought experiment in distinction to instantiated and imagined experiments, and argued that there is a sense in which Molyneux-type questions can be seen as cases of the first class. Furthermore, I considered the interpretation defended by Jacomuzzi, Kobau, and Bruno (2003), and presented a different proposal insofar as their argument (i) relates to Molyneux's original questions instead of Berkeley's Molyneux-type cases, and (ii) is based on the mere claim that Molyneux-type cases are not empirically possible, which does not allow a distinction between imagined and thought experiments. In this sense, I not only refer to Berkeley's Molyneux-type cases, but I add a stronger argument than the one Jacomuzzi et al provide.…”

“…Due to these methodological and empirical constraints, Jacomuzzi, Kobau, and Bruno (2003) argue that Molyneux-type questions in general-not only those present in the NTV-should be read as thought experiments. They consider a wide range of empirical evidence and possible reformulations of Molyneux-type questions, and press the idea that Molyneux's question is a thought experiment due to the impossibility of obtaining the situation envisaged by it.…”

On the Matching of Seen and Felt Shape by Newly Sighted Subjects

“…Second, these subjects must be able to see well enough to represent visually the shapes of the objects they are presented with: otherwise failure to match seen shapes with felt ones would not prove any lack of an intrinsic connection between the representations of vision and touch, as opposed to a purely visual deficit. Several philosophers have suggested that demands like these cannot be met, and so Molyneux's question cannot be answered experimentally at all (Evans 1985 ; Jacomuzzi et al 2003 ; Noë 2004 ; Gallagher 2005 ). However, recent experimental work suggests that those who are given sight late in life may be able to see immediately, challenging the orthodox view of an early ‘critical period’ necessary for visual development (Fine et al 2003 ; Maurer et al 2005 ; Ostrovsky et al 2006 ; Mandavilli 2006 ), and giving hope for an empirical resolution to this longstanding philosophical debate.…”

Learning to see

“…Accordingly, the evidence concerning individuals who have had their sight restored after long-term blindness not only suggests that the sensory presentation thesis is false, but also suggests an alternative theory concerning the role that sensory phenomenology plays in our perceptual awareness of properties. Specifically, this evidence suggests that sensory phenomenology functions in much the same way as linguistic symbols function in thought: while not 2 See, for example, Evans (1985), Jacomuzzi, Kobau andBruno (2003), Van Cleve (2007), Schwenkler (2012Schwenkler ( , 2013, Connolly (2013), and Clarke (2016). 3 I will refine this thesis further in Section 2.…”

“…2 2 See, for example, Evans (1985), Jacomuzzi, Kobau and Bruno (2003), Van Cleve (2007), Schwenkler (2012, 2013), Connolly (2013), and Clarke (2016). …”