In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim-which I call the Variability Thesis-and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories.

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Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of them.These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions.

In our daily lives, we attribute emotions to non-human animals. However, the ontological commitments this implies are still in discussion. Particularly, philosophers still debate whether considerations about the mechanisms underlying emotions are necessary or not to attribute emotions to non-human animals. Here, I argue that such considerations are not sufficient, and that a functionalist perspective is more fruitful than its main contender, the homology thinking view. To do this, I consider findings from experimental psychology on emotion attribution to non-human animals and distinguish two questions concerning such emotions. I then discuss functionalism and homology thinking, claiming that homology thinking precludes promising empirical hypotheses from the outset, resulting in a more limited position than functionalism. Hence, functionalism inherits many benefits of homology thinking while providing more productive grounds.