Moments in Time

Abstract

It has been suggested that perception and action can be understood as evolving in temporal epochs or sequential processing units. Successive events are fused into units forming a unitary experience or “psychological present.” Studies have identified several temporal integration levels on different time scales which are fundamental for our understanding of behavior and subjective experience. In recent literature concerning the philosophy and neuroscience of consciousness these separate temporal processing levels are not always precisely distinguished. Therefore, empirical evidence from psychophysics and neuropsychology on these distinct temporal processing levels is presented and discussed within philosophical conceptualizations of time experience. On an elementary level, one can identify a functional moment, a basic temporal building block of perception in the range of milliseconds that defines simultaneity and succession. Below a certain threshold temporal order is not perceived, individual events are processed as co-temporal. On a second level, an experienced moment, which is based on temporal integration of up to a few seconds, has been reported in many qualitatively different experiments in perception and action. It has been suggested that this segmental processing mechanism creates temporal windows that provide a logistical basis for conscious representation and the experience of nowness. On a third level of integration, continuity of experience is enabled by working memory in the range of multiple seconds allowing the maintenance of cognitive operations and emotional feelings, leading to mental presence, a temporal window of an individual’s experienced presence.

Complementarity of Space and Time in Distance Representations

“…A number of conceptual models have been proposed to solve the paradox how it is possible to perceive duration, when our experiences of time are confined to the present moment (see Droege, 2009;Dainton, 2010a). Findings in cognitive neuroscience and psychophysics indicate that time perception operates at three basic levels termed temporal windows (Pöppel, 2009;Wittmann, 2011). A basic building block of temporal experience is defined by the border between simultaneity and succession, since below a certain temporal threshold 8 (Fraisse, 1984;Dainton, 2010b) temporal order is not perceived.…”

“…a pause in a conversation exceeding 6 seconds, might be felt as disturbingly long (Wackermann, 2007). In that sense, longer duration leads to a phenomenon based on working memory, which encloses a sequence of experienced moments for the representation of mental presence (Wittmann, 2011). Consequently, our momentary experience of nowness is likely to be embedded in a temporal field that stretches across time reaching both into the past and into the future (Droege, 2009).…”

“…It is assumed to be created by a cognitive processing mechanism that segments sensory experience into temporal windows, which are subjective mental constructs without physical existence. Experimental evidence for existence of such temporal windows comes from a variety of studies (see Pöppel, 2009;Wittmann, 2011 for reviews from neuroscience). Experienced moments are required for cognitive synthesis of music 10 and spoken language, since these acoustic events can only be understood in temporal relation to the preceding and the following elements (see Wittmann & Pöppel, 2000).…”

“…The third type of transience distinguished by Evans (2013a) is duration defined as the felt experience of the time's passage constituting an elapse as something that lasts longer than the perceptual moment (see Pöppel, 2009;Wittmann, 2011). It gives raise to an extrinsic temporal frame of reference.…”

“…It is noteworthy that the high frequency of expressions referring to moments suggests their prominent role in temporal cognition (cf. Pöppel, 2009;Wittmann, 2011). Moreover, the day and the year have been found to have a critical impact on human experience and behavior based on neuropsychological and psychophysical evidence (Wittmann & Paulus, 2009).…”