2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00502.x
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Monetary Policy, Bank Lending, and the Risk‐Pricing Channel

Abstract: This paper identifies a monetary policy channel through the risk pricing of bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of deposit (jumbo CDs). Adverse policy shocks increase debt holder perceptions of bank default, increasing the risk premia for some banks, thereby decreasing their external funding of loans. The results show that contractionary policy increases the sensitivity of jumbo‐CD spreads to leverage and asset risk for small banks, and to leverage for large banks. The results also show a distributi… Show more

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Cited by 41 publications
(21 citation statements)
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“…To shed more light on the underlying sources of these heterogeneous responses, we analyse the development of the interest rates banks pay on jumbo certificates of deposits (jumbo CDs) as a proxy for external finance premia (see, for example, Kishan and Opiela ). We find that jumbo CD rates are significantly lower for more liquid banks after surges in uncertainty.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To shed more light on the underlying sources of these heterogeneous responses, we analyse the development of the interest rates banks pay on jumbo certificates of deposits (jumbo CDs) as a proxy for external finance premia (see, for example, Kishan and Opiela ). We find that jumbo CD rates are significantly lower for more liquid banks after surges in uncertainty.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since bank interest rates could be sluggish in adjusting, we analyze the interest rates on overdraft loans (i.e., credit lines) that are standard contracts modified unilaterally and at very short notice by banks; this allows us to fully capture in our quarterly data the effects of the shocks in the interbank market or a change in banks’ behavior due to a repricing of credit risk (Kishan and Opiela ). Moreover, as we investigate the changes in loan interest rates over the horizon 2008:q2–2010:q1, we may reasonably argue that the repricing of credit risk that followed the Lehman default is fully accounted for in our sample…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…low interest rates) and the risk-taking by banks where expansionary monetary policies generate a decrease in risk aversion as a result of lower requirements stipulated for offering loans. Kishan and Opiela (2012) report that these positions trigger more marked declines in loans offered by risk takers in case of a tight monetary policy.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%