Monopoly and Transition to the Market

Kroll, Heidi

doi:10.1080/08826994.1991.10641334

Cited by 26 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…The former Soviet nomenklatura, in fact, provided the base for the post-Soviet elites, both for the political 2 Common practice was the transformation of state ministries into state-firms, e.g. Norilsk Nickel (formerly Soviet Ministry of Metallurgy), Gazprom (formerly Soviet Ministry of Gas Industry) or Neftegazstroi (formerly Soviet Ministry of Construction of Enterprises of the Oil and Gas Industry), see Kroll (1991) and Whitefield (1993).…”

Section: The Emergence Of Russian Oligarchsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Income Inequality and Oligarchs in Russian Regions: A Note

Fidrmuc

Gundacker

2017

SSRN Journal

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We trace the rise of the so called oligarchs in post-Soviet Russia and examine their relationship to income distribution in Russia. When Russia moved to a market economy in the 1990s a new business elite evolved. Russia's distinctive path towards market economy, among other factors, gave rise to the oligarchs who now control large parts of the economy and have a strong standing within politics and society. Using a unique regional data set on the locations of oligarchs' businesses across the Russian regions, we test Acemoglu's (2008) proposition that oligarchic societies experience extreme income inequality. Our results show significantly higher levels of income inequality in regions with a higher presence of oligarchs.

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Section: The Emergence Of Russian Oligarchsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Income Inequality and Oligarchs in Russian Regions: A Note

Fidrmuc

Gundacker

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…20-22); Rumer (1991);and Shatalov (1991). See also Kroll (1991) for a discussion of many of the new property and business forms in the context of antimonopoly policy under perestroyka. over the control of enterprises, has confused the distribution of ownership rights over state property.…”

Section: The Legal Basis Of Spontaneous Privatizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…54 We also encountered several prospective holding companies that will be established to organize an effective monopoly or monopsony. The lack of effective antitrust measures makes the formation of monopolies attractive (Kroll, 1991). Price controls are breaking down, there are no effective regulatory agencies, and a holding company is one attractive way to organize mutual monitoring for members of a cartel.…”

Section: Other State Enterprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managerial Strategies for Spontaneous Privatization

Johnson¹,

Kroll²

1991

Soviet Economy

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Two Western economists examine the rapid changes in property and business forms of enterprises in the former Soviet Union using evidence from intensive interviews conducted through December 1991 and involving 80 industrial and commercial organizations. After reviewing the reforms that provided the legal basis for the process, they describe different managerial strategies employed in spontaneous privatization and examine the ensuing changes in contractual relations of firms with other entities such as ministries or banks. The authors also interpret spontaneous privatization on the basis of literature covering property rights and identify several groups that lose or derive benefits from the transformation. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: P20, L2.

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Section: The Emergence Of Russian Oligarchsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Income inequality and oligarchs in Russian regions: A note

Fidrmuc

Gundacker

2017

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We trace the rise of the so called oligarchs in post-Soviet Russia and examine their relationship to income distribution in Russia. When Russia moved to a market economy in the 1990s a new business elite evolved. Russia's distinctive path towards market economy, among other factors, gave rise to the oligarchs who now control large parts of the economy and have a strong standing within politics and society. Using a unique regional data set on the locations of oligarchs' businesses across the Russian regions, we test Acemoglu's (2008) proposition that oligarchic societies experience extreme income inequality. Our results show significantly higher levels of income inequality in regions with a higher presence of oligarchs. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Codes: L220, D430, P250, P310.

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Monopoly and Transition to the Market

Cited by 26 publications

References 7 publications

Income Inequality and Oligarchs in Russian Regions: A Note

Income Inequality and Oligarchs in Russian Regions: A Note

Managerial Strategies for Spontaneous Privatization

Income inequality and oligarchs in Russian regions: A note

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