Two Western economists examine the rapid changes in property and business forms of enterprises in the former Soviet Union using evidence from intensive interviews conducted through December 1991 and involving 80 industrial and commercial organizations. After reviewing the reforms that provided the legal basis for the process, they describe different managerial strategies employed in spontaneous privatization and examine the ensuing changes in contractual relations of firms with other entities such as ministries or banks. The authors also interpret spontaneous privatization on the basis of literature covering property rights and identify several groups that lose or derive benefits from the transformation. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: P20, L2.

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Precontract negotiations between enterprises play an important role in determining the detailed product mix and the timing of delivery in the Soviet planning system. This paper uses a comparative institutional framework drawn from the law and economics literature to analyze the legal regulation of these negotiations by Gosarbitrazh. In view of features of the Soviet economy which weaken the buyer's influence on the supplier, the key hypothesis is that Gosarbitrazh should favor the buyer in resolving precontract disputes, thereby forcing the supplier to satisfy the buyer's demand. This hypothesis is supported by the reported case law. Journal of Economic Liferature, Classification Numbers: 052, 124.