Moral and Epistemic Luck

Statman, Daniel

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1991.tb00036.x

Cited by 44 publications

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“…Whether or not Williams and Nagel are correct in this point of mutual agreement, our discussions have contributed to showing how the problem of luck is by its nature a metaphilosophical one, because luck threatens in similar ways our conceptions both of moral and of epistemic evaluation (Statman 1991).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Felix Culpa: Luck In Ethics And Epistemology

Axtell

2003

Metaphilosophy

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Luck threatens in similar ways our conceptions of both moral and epistemic evaluation. This essay examines the problem of luck as a metaphilosophical problem spanning the division between subfields in philosophy. I first explore the analogies between ethical and epistemic luck by comparing influential attempts to expunge luck from our conceptions of agency in these two subfields. I then focus upon Duncan Pritchard's challenge to the motivations underlying virtue epistemology, based specifically on its handling of the problem of epistemic luck. I argue that (1) consideration of the multifold nature of the problem of epistemic luck to an adequate account of human knowledge drives us to a mixed externalist epistemology; and (2) the virtue-theoretical approach presents a particularly advantageous way of framing and developing a mixed externalist epistemology.Keywords: virtue epistemology, virtue theory, moral and epistemic luck, internalism and externalism, metaphilosophy. Felix Culpa! [Oh, most fortunate fault!]-St. Augustine

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Felix Culpa: Luck In Ethics And Epistemology

Axtell

2003

Metaphilosophy

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“…So even if the worker had control over the lucky event, 12 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for urging me to consider this alternative account. 13 For Statman (1991); Greco (1995); Zimmerman (1993), and Riggs (2007), the control condition seems to replace the improbability condition. For E.J.…”

Section: Knowledge and Controlmentioning

confidence: 86%

Luck as an epistemic notion

Steglich‐Petersen

2009

Synthese

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Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent's epistemic situation. According to the proposed account, an event is lucky for an agent only if the agent was not in a position to know that the event would occur. It is also explored whether this new account threatens the anti-luck program in epistemology. It is argued that although not detrimental to the anti-luck program, the epistemic account of luck sets certain important limits to its scope and feasibility.

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“…3 1 Proponents of versions of LCR include Statman [1991], Zimmerman [1993], Greco [1995], Coffman [2007], and Riggs [2007]. 2 Thanks to an anonymous referee for comments that led me to add this paragraph.…”

Section: Discussion Note Does Luck Exclude Control? E J Coffmanmentioning

confidence: 98%

Does Luck Exclude Control?

Coffman

2009

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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Moral and Epistemic Luck

Cited by 44 publications

References 0 publications

Felix Culpa: Luck In Ethics And Epistemology

Felix Culpa: Luck In Ethics And Epistemology

Luck as an epistemic notion

Does Luck Exclude Control?

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