Moral Anger Is More Flexible Than Moral Disgust

Abstract

The research examines whether anger rather than disgust will be more likely to be responsible for changes in moral judgment, after individuals consider potential circumstances. Participants first read a scenario that described a moral violation (harm/fairness versus purity) and then gave their initial moral judgment and emotions

Consenting to counter-normative sexual acts: Differential effects of consent on anger and disgust as a function of transgressor or consenter

“…Conversely, anger should be less focused on victims, or individuals who have been wronged, who generally evoke sympathy from third parties (see Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010), and when there is mutual consent between individuals, the event should be less aggravating to third parties, since no injustice has occurred. This would be consistent with other research showing that anger is a flexible emotion, sensitive to the actors' reasons for acting and the circumstances surrounding an act of wrongdoing (Piazza, Russell, & Sousa, 2013;Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c.…”

“…In the present research, we compared the influence of consent on anger and disgust, both of which have been linked to judgments of wrongdoing and condemnation (e.g., Haidt, 2003;Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009;Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009;Prinz, 2007;Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999;Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2013Russell, Piazza, & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Most perspectives consider disgust the primary emotion relevant to the sexual domain (see e.g., Haidt, 2003;Horberg et al, 2009;Prinz, 2007;Rozin et al, 1999) and the general trend has been to focus on reactions to the action or transgressor (e.g., Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008;Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).…”

Moral emotions and the envisaging of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing

“…Therefore, this research does not speak directly to how disgust and anger relate to the ability to generate and respond to counterfactuals, but only to anger and disgust differentially influencing the production of mitigating circumstances (cf. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011b). Our methods also did not draw a strong distinction between partial and full mitigation, that is, between "mitigating circumstances"…”

Cognitive parallels between moral judgment and modal judgment

“…Indeed, psychologists have identified a number of emotions that seem to be specifically "moral" in nature, including guilt, shame, gratitude, and contempt (Haidt, 2003). While there has been no documentation, to our knowledge, of a corresponding suite of "modal emotions," such emotions, if they do exist, would seem to play a less significant role in modal judgment than the role played by emotion in moral judgment (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011;Strohminger, Lewis, & Meyer, 2011). Thus, common patterns of reasoning across the two domains might help determine the proportion of variance in moral judgment that can be accounted for by seemingly nonaffective processes.…”