Moral Foundations, Intuitions of Justice, and the Intricacies of Punitive Sentiment

Abstract

Silver 1 Haidt (2012) proposes that Fairness/Reciprocity be divided into two foundations: Fairness/Cheating (regarding concerns about trustworthiness, reciprocity, cheating) and Liberty/Oppression (regarding concerns about individual rights, equal treatment, and freedom). Currently, however, measures of these foundations are unavailable. Potential consequences are considered in the discussion.

Moral foundations theory and the psychology of charitable giving

“…Moral foundations theory has generated a rapidly growing body of work spanning diverse research topics, such as political psychology, attitude change, environmental sustainability, and the psychology of law (Day, Fiske, Downing, & Trail, 2014;Feinberg & Willer, 2013;Graham et al, 2009;Silver, 2017). Nevertheless, there is still remarkably little research on how moral foundations are manifested in real-world behaviour, partly due to a traditional split between the study of moral judgment and the study of moral behaviour in moral psychological research (Ellemers, van der Toorn, Paunov, & van Leeuwen, 2019;Graham et al, 2013;Graham & Valdesolo, 2018).…”

Binding Morality and Perceived Harm as Sources of Moral Regulation Law Support Among Political and Religious Conservatives

“…As binding moral values lose their hold in contemporary Western society, the public may become more tolerant of “immoral” behaviors (Euchner et al 2013; Mucciaroni 2011; Schnabel and Sevell 2017) and less tolerant of laws restricting harmless yet “immoral” behaviors (Euchner et al 2013; Pinker 2011). A similar logic suggests that cross‐cultural variation in moral foundations may help to explain differing punitive and regulatory regimes across countries or regions (Silver 2017).…”

“…Understanding the sources of moral regulation law support may also help to explain the adoption of moral regulation laws over time or across cultures. As various scholars have noted, the past several decades have been marked by an increasing emphasis on individual needs and autonomy in place of binding moral concerns (Pinker 2011; Schnabel and Sevell 2017; Silver 2017; Stets and Carter 2012). As binding moral values lose their hold in contemporary Western society, the public may become more tolerant of “immoral” behaviors (Euchner et al 2013; Mucciaroni 2011; Schnabel and Sevell 2017) and less tolerant of laws restricting harmless yet “immoral” behaviors (Euchner et al 2013; Pinker 2011).…”

“…Although moral beliefs are implicated in several of these explanations, research on conservatives' moral regulation law support has yet to incorporate recent developments in moral psychology. This is an important oversight given that conservatives and liberals are thought to experience intuitive moral concerns about different domains <<FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT>> (Graham and Haidt 2009; Haidt 2012; Haidt and Hersh 2001; Miles and Vaisey 2015; Silver and Silver 2017), which may have implications for understanding preferences regarding law and punishment (Silver 2017; Vaughn et al 2019).…”

“…Binding morality has also been implicated as a source of various sociolegal preferences, including views about deviance, crime, law, and punishment (Haidt and Graham 2007; Koleva et al 2012; Rottman et al 2014; Silver 2017; Silver and Silver 2017; Vaughn et al 2019). More generally, research suggests that lay moral intuitions form the bedrock upon which legal codes are constructed (Robinson 2013).…”