2017
DOI: 10.3368/le.93.2.179
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Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States

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Cited by 78 publications
(90 citation statements)
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References 75 publications
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“…The members aim to find other solutions to flood risk beyond insurance and indeed we find significant correlations between insurance and the other measures of between 0.3 and 0.7. These findings have been confirmed by other studies (Hudson et al 2015, Lindell and Hwang 2008). However, there may also be an exchange in the groups regarding the most appropriate insurance cover, which was also confirmed by the groups themselves, which may result in a more comprehensive cover for members.…”
Section: Flood Action Groupssupporting
confidence: 82%
“…The members aim to find other solutions to flood risk beyond insurance and indeed we find significant correlations between insurance and the other measures of between 0.3 and 0.7. These findings have been confirmed by other studies (Hudson et al 2015, Lindell and Hwang 2008). However, there may also be an exchange in the groups regarding the most appropriate insurance cover, which was also confirmed by the groups themselves, which may result in a more comprehensive cover for members.…”
Section: Flood Action Groupssupporting
confidence: 82%
“…Moral hazards have been observed in a broad range of insurance markets such as automobile, long-term care, and health [18]. A limited number of empirical studies that have been conducted in the domain of natural disaster insurance market however find little evidence for the presence of moral hazards [19]. Instead, they find that insurance purchases can increase the tendency towards self-protection against flooding across insured individuals [19][20][21][22].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Public authorities can observe that the cost of flood premiums does not prevent a great number of householders from purchasing flood coverage, despite householders complaining about the growing costs of premiums particularly after a major disaster. As for insurance firms, they find in this model evidence that support their concern over adverse selection and moral hazard (Hudson et al 2014). By being able to match flood risks with the cost of premiums, as Kunreuther (2008) advocate, insurance firms reduce their risk of insuring for lower prices householders that present higher risks and repetitive losses.…”
mentioning
confidence: 74%
“…Respondents that estimate higher losses to major floods are more likely to take out flood insurance. This intuitive finding is also relevant in terms of revealing that risk aversion is also an important factor to be consider when assessing decision making under uncertain scenarios (Hudson et al 2014;Petrolia et al 2013;Poussin et al 2014).…”
mentioning
confidence: 80%