Moral Hazards and Effects of IT-enabled Monitoring Systems in Online Labor Markets

Liang, Chen; Hong, Yili; Gu, Bin

doi:10.24251/hicss.2017.006

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 42 publications

(92 reference statements)

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“…For example, software developers on a crowdsource coding marketplace materially benefit from superior site-based reputation scores both by making higher bids and by being more likely to be chosen (Moreno & Terwiesch, 2014). They conclude that the availability of this surveillance option lowered clients' preference for high-reputation bidders in time-based (hourly) projects, thereby making the market more competitive (Liang et al, 2016). Another way Upwork workers can capitalize on a strong site-based reputation is by establishing an "agency."…”

Section: Do Workers Have Control Over Their Work Assignments or Compementioning

confidence: 99%

Micro-entrepreneurs, Dependent Contractors, and Instaserfs: Understanding Online Labor Platform Workforces

Kuhn

Maleki

2017

AMP

274

290

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The rapidly growing number of people who find work via online labor platforms are not employees, nor do they necessarily fit traditional conceptualizations of independent contractors, freelancers, or the selfemployed. The ambiguous nature of their employment status and its implications for worker well-being have attracted substantial controversy, but to date most empirical research in this area has focused on the market efficiency of a single platform rather than on workers themselves and related human resource management issues. Research progress will require understanding how online labor platform work differs from other types of nonstandard employment arrangements, as well as critical differences across different labor platform firms in how work and workers are managed. This paper proposes a conceptual classification framework to facilitate research on the attitudes, experiences, and outcomes of workers who use these platforms. We explore how labor platform firms' operational choices shape how control is allocated across workers, clients, and the firm, and how they influence workers' autonomy, incentives, and degree of economic dependence on the firm. Implications for theory development, research, and managing worker-firm relations are discussed.

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Section: Do Workers Have Control Over Their Work Assignments or Compementioning

confidence: 99%

Micro-entrepreneurs, Dependent Contractors, and Instaserfs: Understanding Online Labor Platform Workforces

Kuhn

Maleki

2017

AMP

274

290

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“…The results of the endogenous treatment effects regressions, which make use of the two instruments, are reported in Table 3. In keeping with the prior literature (e.g., Liang et al 2016), we also include project expertise levels as predictors in the first-stage contract choice equation. The first stage results show how the instrumental variables affect the choice of contract type.…”

Section: Models With Endogenous Treatment Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract Choice, Moral Hazard and Performance Evaluation Evidence from Online Labor Markets

Wang¹,

Huang²

2022

Proceedings

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Due to the spatial and temporal separations between clients and freelancers, online labor markets (OLMs) are particularly susceptible to issues related to information asymmetry. Based on the economics of information, we hypothesize that the choice of contract type-i.e., between the fixed-priced (FP) contract and the time-and-materials (TM) contract-has important implications for curbing moral hazard during contract execution, and therefore will influence the client's perceived contractual performance upon project completion. We test the predictions by assembling a dataset of data analytics projects completed by freelancers on Upwork, the largest online freelancing platform. We find that, consistent with our hypothesis, freelancers under a TM contract receive significantly lower performance ratings by their clients on average compared to those under an FP contract. Interestingly, we also find that the level of expertise required for a project moderates the effect of contract choice on client satisfaction; the negative impact of a TM contract is smaller (i.e., less negative) when a project requires intermediate-level or expert-level skills. Our study offers useful insights into an important institutional determinant of contractual performance evaluation, which has profound implications for freelancers' reputations in OLMs.

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“…Other research was focused at the client end of the value chain: for example, identifying digital labour platforms as reducing the barriers to offshoring, thus enabling a wider range of client organisations to become involved (Hanley and Ott, 2012). Later work in the same stream focused on the practicalities of managing digital labour platforms, looking at the ICT-enabled work monitoring systems (Liang et al, 2016) or use of feedback and profile information (Assemi and Schlagwein, 2016) that underpin the functioning of platforms.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Digital labour platforms in Pakistan: institutional voids and solidarity networks

Malik

Heeks

Masiero

et al. 2021

ITP

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PurposeWhile digital labour platforms are being increasingly studied across the Global South, the existing literature does not conceptualise the theoretical link between such platforms and socio-economic development. This paper theorises such a link drawing on the notion of institutional voids defined, as in Khanna and Palepu (2010), as “the absence of intermediaries to efficiently connect buyers and sellers” in an economy. We frame digital labour platforms as means to fill institutional voids, seeking to create “development” in the form of earning opportunities in contexts of deprivation.Design/methodology/approachWe draw on an interpretive case study of an online work training project in a deprived region of Pakistan, where members of marginalised communities were trained to become freelancers for global digital labour platforms. We use the notion of market-enabling institutions aimed at filling institutional voids as a lens to study the project's declared goals, examining the extent to which these were met in practice for the workers who participated in the training.FindingsOur analysis reveals three types of market-enabling institutions–credibility enhancers, aggregators and distributors, and transaction facilitators–through which digital labour platforms seek to fill institutional voids. However, workers' narratives reveal that institutional voids are only partially filled by these platforms, and their perpetuation results in diverse forms of power asymmetries leveraged by clients and owners of the platforms. We also observe the formation of solidarity networks among workers, networks that are intra-familial and societal rather than characterised by formal unionisation.Originality/valueThe paper offers a novel perspective to theorise the link between digital labour and socio-economic development. Applying such a perspective in a Global South context, it also finds the limits of the digital platforms' institutional void-filling potential, highlighting the emergence of power asymmetries and the emerging formation of worker solidarity networks.

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Moral Hazards and Effects of IT-enabled Monitoring Systems in Online Labor Markets

Abstract: Abstract

Cited by 10 publications

References 42 publications

Micro-entrepreneurs, Dependent Contractors, and Instaserfs: Understanding Online Labor Platform Workforces

Micro-entrepreneurs, Dependent Contractors, and Instaserfs: Understanding Online Labor Platform Workforces

Contract Choice, Moral Hazard and Performance Evaluation Evidence from Online Labor Markets

Digital labour platforms in Pakistan: institutional voids and solidarity networks

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