Moral priorities under risk

Lee‐Stronach, Chad

doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1415104

Cited by 8 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…But these solutions would still leave the objective absolutist value function vulnerable to the sequence objection identified above. Bartha [2007]; Bostrom [2011]; Lee-Stronach [2016]. 28 This involves some contentious modelling choices; our aim is for a proof of concept, not to defend a specific set of numbers.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Axiological Absolutism and Risk1

Lazar

Lee‐Stronach

2017

Nous

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Consider the following claim: given the choice between saving a life and preventing any number of people from temporarily experiencing a mild headache, you should always save the life. Many moral theorists accept this claim. In doing so, they commit themselves to some form of ‘moral absolutism’: the view that there are some moral considerations (like being able to save a life) that cannot be outweighed by any number of lesser moral considerations (like being able to avert a mild headache). In contexts of certainty, it is clear what moral absolutism requires of you. However, what does it require of you when deciding under risk? What ought you to do when there is a chance that, say, you will not succeed in saving the life? In recent years, various critics have argued that moral absolutism cannot satisfactorily deal with risk and should, therefore, be abandoned. In this paper, we show that moral absolutism can answer its critics by drawing on—of all things—orthodox expected utility theory.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But these solutions would still leave the objective absolutist value function vulnerable to the sequence objection identified above. Bartha []; Bostrom []; Lee‐Stronach [].…”

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confidence: 99%

Axiological Absolutism and Risk1

Lazar

Lee‐Stronach

2017

Nous

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“…2 For attempts to give such accounts, see for example Carlson (2000), Lee-Stronach (2018), or Lazar and Lee-Stronach (2019). For criticism of such accounts, see for example Norcross (1997 and, Huemer (2010), or Frick (2015).…”

Section: Lives Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Or, ethical deontologists sometimes say that low probability outcomes can be ignored for the purposes of determining what we ought to do, which also avoids this sort of issue (e.g. Aboodi et al 2008, Lee-Stronach 2018. Perhaps epistemic deontologists can do the same.…”

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confidence: 99%

Headaches for epistemologists

Talbot

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Consider someone who has achieved a high level of rational confidence about the meaning of life, and is in fact correct in their view. Like most people, they also have high rational confidences about a vast range of more mundane but still somewhat important truths -where their car keys are, what color their shirt is, whether it will rain tomorrow, etc. The devil gives them a choice: surrender their knowledge of the meaning of life, becoming fully uncertain about this topic forever, or instead give up a tiny bit of certainty about each of these mundane topics. Intuitively, they ought to choose the latter, no matter how many credences about mundane topics the choice involves. We get the same intuition if we replace the belief about the meaning of life with a belief about some other extremely important-seeming topic, such as the existence of God, core moral truths, and so forth. But what if the devil had given them a different choice: lose just a tiny bit of certainty about the meaning of life or lose everything

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“…For example, there are a number of recent discussions of how to formally model deontological theories that allow for lexical priorities of duties – for example, theories that say no number of duties to keep promises can outweigh a single duty to not take a life (e.g. Lee-Stronach 2018, Lazar & Lee-Stronach 2019). It's not enough to give formal models which issue the correct verdicts about wrongness and permissibility.…”

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confidence: 99%

Why Impossible Options Are Better: Consequentializing Dilemmas

Talbot¹

2020

Utilitas

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To consequentialize a deontological moral theory is to give a theory which issues the same moral verdicts, but explains those verdicts in terms of maximizing or satisficing value. There are many motivations for consequentializing: to reconcile plausible ideas behind deontology with plausible ideas behind consequentialism, to help us better understand deontological theories, or to extend deontological theories beyond what intuitions alone tell us. It has proven difficult to consequentialize theories that allow for moral dilemmas or that deny that “ought” implies “can.” This article argues that the problem is best solved by allowing impossible actions as inputs into consequentializations. It shows that all other approaches that have been advocated are inadequate. It also argues that progress in consequentialization, and in formal ethics more generally, requires thinking about more than just wrongness and permissibility; we should think about contrary-to-duty obligations and degrees of wrongness as well.

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Moral priorities under risk

Cited by 8 publications

References 23 publications

Axiological Absolutism and Risk1

Axiological Absolutism and Risk1

Headaches for epistemologists

Why Impossible Options Are Better: Consequentializing Dilemmas

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