Axiological Absolutism and Risk1

Abstract

Consider the following claim: given the choice between saving a life and preventing any number of people from temporarily experiencing a mild headache, you should always save the life. Many moral theorists accept this claim. In doing so, they commit themselves to some form of ‘moral absolutism’: the view that there are some moral considerations (like being able to save a life) that cannot be outweighed by any number of lesser moral considerations (like being able to avert a mild headache). In contexts of certainty, it is clear what moral absolutism requires of you. However, what does it require of you when deciding under risk? What ought you to do when there is a chance that, say, you will not succeed in saving the life? In recent years, various critics have argued that moral absolutism cannot satisfactorily deal with risk and should, therefore, be abandoned. In this paper, we show that moral absolutism can answer its critics by drawing on—of all things—orthodox expected utility theory.

Ethical machine decisions and the input-selection problem

“…See also Vrščaj et al (2020) for two empirical studies of attitudes on autonomous vehicles (including privacy) and some more references; and Zimmer (2005) for a discussion on privacy and vehicle-to-vehicle communication. 43 Kosinski et al (2013). See also Ohm (2010) and Lundgren (2020b) for several other examples.…”

Untitled

“…According to Lem's logic, our species may never be able to read or understand a message from extraterrestrials" (Herkewitz, 2019). Besides, in conformity with the conception of axiological absolutism (Seth & Chad, 2019), if a system faces a danger from outside, it is forced to prefer protection of internal space to perspectives of new levels of identification of the Other. In the opinion of Lazar Seth and Lee-Stronach Chad, the humankind will have to make a choice in keeping with "higher moral consideration" (Seth & Chad, 2019: 98).…”

Moral priorities under risk

“…23.For discussion of this idea, see: Carlson (2001). As applied to ethics and risk, see: Lazar and Lee-Stronach (2017). …”

“…18.This discussion addresses synchronic versions of the Agglomeration Problem. For a discussion of strategies for solving the diachronic versions of the Agglomeration Problem, see: Lazar and Lee-Stronach (2017). …”