Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity

Mogensen, Andreas L.

doi:10.1111/phpr.12255

Cited by 35 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“… See Nickel (), Hopkins (), and Hills (). Fichte also anticipates Mogensen's () claim that an ideal of ‘authenticity’ informs our skepticism about moral deference. …”

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confidence: 63%

“…33 See Nickel (2001), Hopkins (2007, and Hills (2009). Fichte also anticipates Mogensen's (2015) claim that an ideal of 'authenticity' informs our skepticism about moral deference. 34 As Hills explains, in treating moral testimony as advice, 'you are not simply putting your trust in it or deferring to it; you are using your own judgment about the matter at issue ' (2009: 123).…”

Section: Moral Deference and Moral Expertisementioning

confidence: 99%

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Fichte on Conscience

Ware

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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There is no question that Fichte's theory of conscience is central to his system of ethics. Yet his descriptions of its role in practical deliberation appear inconsistent, if not contradictory. Many scholars have claimed that for Fichte conscience plays a material role by providing the content of our moral obligations -the Material Function View. Some have denied this, however, claiming that conscience only plays a formal role by testing our moral convictions in any given case-the Formal Function View. My aim in this paper is to offer a new contribution to this debate. I begin by supplying further evidence in support of the view that conscience only plays a formal function in Fichte's ethics. Then I call attention to a deeper problem this view faces, namely, that it invites an infinite regress by making one's conviction a matter of higher-order reflection. The key to overcoming this threat, I argue, lies in Fichte's doctrine of feeling, whereby the criterion of one's conviction lies, not in a cognitive state, but in an affective state. In closing, I discuss the relevance of Fichte's theory for current debates over the nature of moral error and moral deference.It is an absolute duty not to accept any command or dictum without examining it for oneself, but first to test it through one's own conscience; it is absolutely unconscionable to omit this test.-Fichte (SL 4:177).

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“… See Nickel (), Hopkins (), and Hills (). Fichte also anticipates Mogensen's () claim that an ideal of ‘authenticity’ informs our skepticism about moral deference. …”

mentioning

confidence: 63%

Section: Moral Deference and Moral Expertisementioning

confidence: 99%

Fichte on Conscience

Ware

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Moreover, it gives you the kind of sensitivity to reasons that allows you to 13 Howell (2014), (Hills 2009(Hills , 2010(Hills , 2015. Other objections involve the autonomy (Driver 2006) and authenticity (Mogensen 2017) of the resulting moral judgements. draw your conclusions on the basis of the reasons that make them correct.…”

Section: Does Moral Propagation Avoid the Non-epistemic Problems Withmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation

Hills

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

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The status of moral testimony has recently been challenged, for both epistemic and non-epistemic reasons. This paper distinguishes two methods of teaching: transmission, "classic" learning from testimony, that results in second hand knowledge, and propagation which results in first hand knowledge and understanding. Moral propagation avoids most of the epistemic and non-epistemic problems of transmission. Moreover, moral propagation can develop and refine non-cognitive attitudes too. Therefore moral testimony should (and normally does) take the form of moral propagation, not transmission.

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“…For example, Sliwa thinks that what explains the off-puttingness with moral deference is that: (a) it reveals that the deferrer is ignorant of obvious moral truths, (b) it involves controversial claims, or (c) it involves ulterior motives. In Lewis (forthcoming), I argue that these authors fail to show that moral (or normative) testimony is just like testimony in other domains.5Mogensen (2017) independently makes this point, but only briefly defends it (271-72). The first part of this paper provides an extended defense of it.6 This puzzle is only meant to apply to extant versions of the Achievement Explanation.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…For our purposes, I need not take a position on Hills's claim. For arguments against this claim, seeHowell (2014) andMogensen (2017). For an argument that moral understanding is reducible to moral knowledge, seeSliwa (2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

The New Puzzle of Moral Deference

Lewis

2020

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Philosophers think that there is something fishy about moral deference. The most common explanation of this fishiness is that moral deference doesn’t yield the epistemic states necessary for certain moral achievements (e.g., acting with moral worth or being virtuous). First, I argue that this explanation overgeneralizes. It entails that using many intuitively kosher belief-formation methods (e.g., abduction, reductio ad absurdum, and intuition) should be off-putting. Second, I argue that moral deference is sometimes superior to these other methods because it puts one in a better position to gain the relevant moral achievements.

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Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity

Cited by 35 publications

References 41 publications

Fichte on Conscience

Fichte on Conscience

Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation

The New Puzzle of Moral Deference

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