More Efficient Digital Signatures with Tight Multi-user Security

Diemert, Denis; Gellert, Kai; Jager, Tibor; Lyu, Lin

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-75248-4_1

Cited by 24 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…As an instantiation of our approach, we prove that under the strong CDH assumption the classical Burmester-Desmedt protocol is a tightly secure VGKE protocol [12]. Combining with a tightly StCorrCMA-secure signature (for instance, [17]), it yields the first tightly secure GAKE protocol. Alternatively, our transformation can be viewed as a tight improvement on the (non-tight) generic compiler of Katz and Yung [31] where we require the underlying non-authenticated group key exchange protocol to be verifiable.…”

Section: An Extension and Open Problemsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…For preparation, we assume that a Test session does not contain any valid forgeries. This can be tightly justified by the StCorrCMA security of the underlying signature scheme, which can be instantiated with the recent scheme in [17].…”

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For complete tightness, all these protocols require tight multiuser security of their underlying signature scheme. We implement the signature scheme in all protocols with the recent efficient scheme from Diemert et al [17] whose signatures contain 3 Z p elements, and whose security is based on the DDH assumption. The implementation of TLS is according to the recent tight proofs in [15,18], and we instantiate the underlying signature scheme with the same DDH-based scheme from [17].…”

Section: Protocol Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We detail the comparison with JKRS [28]. Using the DDH-based signature scheme in [17], the communication complexity of our signed DH protocol is (2, 0, 6), while that of JKRS is (5, 1, 3). We suppose the efficiency of our protocol is comparable to JKRS.…”

Section: Protocol Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We denote Comm. as the communication complexity of the protocols in terms of the number of group elements, hashes and Z p elements (which is due to the use of the signature scheme in [17]). The column Model lists the AKE security model and distinguishes between multi-bit guessing (MBG) and the single-bit-guessing (SBG) security .…”

Section: Protocol Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Signed (Group) Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange with Tight Security

2022

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We propose the first tight security proof for the ordinary two-message signed Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol in the random oracle model. Our proof is based on the strong computational Diffie–Hellman assumption and the multiuser security of a digital signature scheme. With our security proof, the signed DH protocol can be deployed with optimal parameters, independent of the number of users or sessions, without the need to compensate any security loss. We abstract our approach with a new notion called verifiable key exchange. In contrast to a known tight three-message variant of the signed Diffie–Hellman protocol (Gjøsteen and Jager, in: Shacham, Boldyreva (eds) CRYPTO 2018, Part II. LNCS, Springer, Heidelberg, 2018), we do not require any modification to the original protocol, and our tightness result is proven in the “Single-Bit-Guess” model which we know can be tightly composed with symmetric cryptographic primitives to establish a secure channel. Finally, we extend our approach to the group setting and construct the first tightly secure group authenticated key exchange protocol.

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Section: An Extension and Open Problemsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Protocol Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Protocol Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Protocol Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Signed (Group) Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange with Tight Security

2022

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Signed Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange with Tight Security

Pan

Qian

Ringerud

2021

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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We propose the first tight security proof for the ordinary two-message signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol in the random oracle model. Our proof is based on the strong computational Diffie-Hellman assumption and the multi-user security of a digital signature scheme. With our security proof, the signed DH protocol can be deployed with optimal parameters, independent of the number of users or sessions, without the need to compensate any security loss. We abstract our approach with a new notion called verifiable key exchange.In contrast to a known tight three-message variant of the signed Diffie-Hellman protocol (Gjøsteen and Jager, CRYPTO 2018), we do not require any modification to the original protocol, and our tightness result is proven in the "Single-Bit-Guess" model which we know can be tightly composed with symmetric cryptographic primitives to establish a secure channel.

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Short Identity-Based Signatures with Tight Security from Lattices

Pan

Wagner

2021

Post-Quantum Cryptography

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More Efficient Digital Signatures with Tight Multi-user Security

Cited by 24 publications

References 34 publications

Signed (Group) Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange with Tight Security

Signed (Group) Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange with Tight Security

Signed Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange with Tight Security

Short Identity-Based Signatures with Tight Security from Lattices

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