Abstract. Applications of elliptic curve cryptography to anonymity, privacy and censorship circumvention call for methods to represent uniformly random points on elliptic curves as uniformly random bit strings, so that, for example, ECC network traffic can masquerade as random traffic.At ACM CCS 2013, Bernstein et al. proposed an efficient approach, called "Elligator," to solving this problem for arbitrary elliptic curve-based cryptographic protocols, based on the use of efficiently invertible maps to elliptic curves. Unfortunately, such invertible maps are only known to exist for certain classes of curves, excluding in particular curves of prime order and curves over binary fields. A variant of this approach, "Elligator Squared," was later proposed by Tibouchi (FC 2014) supporting not necessarily injective encodings to elliptic curves (and hence a much larger class of curves), but, although some rough efficiency estimates were provided, it was not clear how an actual implementation of that approach would perform in practice.In this paper, we show that Elligator Squared can indeed be implemented very efficiently with a suitable choice of curve encodings. More precisely, we consider the binary curve setting (which was not discussed in Tibouchi's paper), and implement the Elligator Squared bit string representation algorithm based on a suitably optimized version of the Shallue-van de Woestijne characteristic 2 encoding, which we show can be computed using only multiplications, trace and half-trace computations, and a few inversions.On the fast binary curve of Oliveira et al. (CHES 2013), our implementation runs in an average of only 22850 Haswell cycles, making uniform bit string representations possible for a very reasonable overhead-much smaller even than Elligator on Edwards curves.As a side contribution, we also compare implementations of Elligator and Elligator Squared on a curve supported by Elligator, namely Curve25519. We find that generating a random point and its uniform bitstring representation is around 35-40% faster with Elligator for protocols using a fixed base point (such as static ECDH), but 30-35% faster with Elligator Squared in the case of a variable base point (such as ElGamal encryption). Both are significantly slower than our binary curve implementation.

Structure-preserving cryptography is a world where messages, signatures, ciphertexts and public keys are entirely made of elements of a group over which a bilinear map is efficiently computable. While structure-preserving signatures have received much attention the last 6 years, structure-preserving encryption schemes have undergone slower development. In particular, the best known structure-preserving cryptosystems with chosen-ciphertext (IND-CCA2) security either rely on symmetric pairings or require long ciphertexts comprised of hundreds of group elements or do not provide publicly verifiable ciphertexts. We provide a publicly verifiable construction based on the SXDH assumption in asymmetric bilinear groups e : G ×Ĝ → GT , which features relatively short ciphertexts. For typical parameters, our ciphertext size amounts to less than 40 elements of G. As a second contribution, we provide a structure-preserving encryption scheme with perfectly randomizable ciphertexts and replayable chosen-ciphertext security. Our new RCCAsecure system significantly improves upon the best known system featuring similar properties in terms of ciphertext size.

Abstract. Ring signatures make it possible for a signer to anonymously and, yet, convincingly leak a secret by signing a message while concealing his identity within a flexibly chosen ring of users. Unlike group signatures, they do not involve any setup phase or tracing authority. Despite a lot of research efforts in more than 15 years, most of their realizations require linear-size signatures in the cardinality of the ring. In the random oracle model, two recent constructions decreased the signature length to be only logarithmic in the number N of ring members. On the downside, their suffer from rather loose reductions incurred by the use of the Forking Lemma. In this paper, we consider the problem of proving them tightly secure without affecting their space efficiency. Surprisingly, existing techniques for proving tight security in ordinary signature schemes do not trivially extend to the ring signature setting. We overcome these difficulties by combining the Groth-Kohlweiss Σ-protocol (Eurocrypt'15) with dualmode encryption schemes. Our main result is a fully tight construction based on the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. By full tightness, we mean that the reduction's advantage is as large as the adversary's, up to a constant factor.

No abstract

No abstract