Abstract. If we assume metaphors to be deeply entrenched correspondences between two conceptual domains that are manifested by highly conventional linguistic expressions in the lexicon, we cannot account for two aspects of metaphor that are crucially important. First, if we identify metaphors with isolated conceptual structures that ϐind expression in the lexicon, we cannot appreciate the role of metaphor in real discourse. Second, if we view metaphors as a set of entrenched conceptual correspondences that give rise to conventionalized linguistic expressions, it is not possible to account for much of the creativity of metaphors. The paper argues that we can, and should, go beyond these difϐiculties in conceptual metaphor theory. First, I argue, together with others, that conceptual metaphor theory must recognize the discourse-organizing force of metaphors. To this eff ect, I point out both the intertextual and intratextual eff ects of conceptual metaphors in real discourse. Second, I argue that there are several distinct types of metaphorical creativity that appear in discourse, including source-related creativity, target-related creativity, and creativity that is the result of "context-induced" metaphors. Of these, I discuss source-related and targetrelated creativity in the present paper.In recent years, a large number of scholars have criticized the theory of conceptual metaphor for a variety of reasons (for example, Cameron,