Moscow’s “turn to the East” and challenges to Russia–South Korea economic collaboration under the New Northern Policy

Abstract

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has not traditionally regarded the Russian Federation as an important partner in the Korean security crisis. Nevertheless, the ROK–Russia relationship has grown by leaps and bounds. Furthermore, the Moon Jae-in administration’s “New Northern Policy,” which focuses especially on economic collaboration with Russia, exhibits a great deal of compatibility with the “turn to the East” in the Russian Federation’s recent foreign and domestic policies. For Seoul, the “New Northern Policy” is not simply a means of generating economic benefits for the ROK but is also part of Seoul’s plans for promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, the Kremlin shares with South Korea not only the goal of increased economic interconnectivity but also a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, two main barriers exist undermining aims outlined in the New Northern Policy. The continuation of the crisis over North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, particularly the perpetuation of the various layers of sanctions against Pyongyang, frustrate the economic integration as espoused in the New Northern Policy. Furthermore, economic conditions within Russia, namely, a lack of economic development within the Russian Far East, frustrate South Korean hopes for greater trade connectivity with Russia. Substantial changes to both the Northeast Asian sub-regional order as well as in the Russian Federation’s domestic economic situation, therefore, are necessary before the prospects envisioned in Seoul’s New Northern Policy can be realized.

The Impact of the Ukraine War on Russian–North Korean Relations

“…South Korea still holds out hope for help from Russia in building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by resolving North Korean nuclear issues. Thus, it is unlikely that Russia and South Korea will burn their economic bridges (Kapoor 2020;Rinna 2019). However, a different situation may develop.…”

“…However, too heavy a reliance on China might not be conducive to the creation of Russia's own economic and strategic space. Thus it is important for Russia to strengthen relations with countries in Northeast Asia, including North Korea (Blank 2015;Lukin and Toloraya 2017;Lukin and Zakharova 2017;Rinna 2019).…”

“…But the results have been meager, largely because of the sanctions imposed on North Korea for its nuclear and missile developments. And from the Russian perspective, South Korea has been cautious in committing investment to the projects due to its alliance with the US (Lukin and Toloraya 2017;Lukin and Zakharova 2017;Rinna 2019;Zakharova 2019).…”

Russian in the multilingual environment of three Asian countries

“…Although hopes for quick economic benefits expressed at the beginning of the 1990s failed, some expectations were gradually fulfilled, e.g., Samsung, LG, Hyundai, and Kia's trade cooperation with Russia. South Korea is becoming increasingly important in the Russian plans to develop the Far East which can benefit from the Korean New Northern Policy (Hoon 1993, Rinna 2019. Today, teaching Russian in South Korea has already become a tradition; it is studied at about 40 universities and ranks among popular foreign languages.…”