Explaining Compliance 2011
DOI: 10.4337/9780857938732.00008
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Motivating Compliance: Economic and Material Motives for Compliance

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Cited by 17 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…The crucial finding in our sample is that both embarassment if relevant others learn about noncompliance and the acceptance of rules foster compliant behavior. This result can be interpreted as being in line with findings by Simpson and Rorie (), who stated that managers care more about informal sanctions due to the discovery of illegal behavior by relevant others (including family or peers) than about formal sanctions by authorities. The regulator might use two strategies (or a combination of both): stressing monetary consequences due to penalty points and steering individual's behavior by addressing nonmonetary goals.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 89%
“…The crucial finding in our sample is that both embarassment if relevant others learn about noncompliance and the acceptance of rules foster compliant behavior. This result can be interpreted as being in line with findings by Simpson and Rorie (), who stated that managers care more about informal sanctions due to the discovery of illegal behavior by relevant others (including family or peers) than about formal sanctions by authorities. The regulator might use two strategies (or a combination of both): stressing monetary consequences due to penalty points and steering individual's behavior by addressing nonmonetary goals.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 89%
“…Additionally, there are ample explorations of compliance motivations for firms (cf. Simpson & Rorie, ; Tyler, ). But, we contend (as do others; cf.…”
Section: The Front Lines Of Environmental Regulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this study, we follow three approaches as part of this original cost‐benefit approach. First, while many cost‐benefit studies of compliance continue to focus on the eventual costs of violating the law by studying deterrence (i.e., Parker and Nielsen ; Gunningham, Thornton, and Kagan ), some scholars also analyze the immediate operational costs and benefits of both violation and compliance as they occur within everyday business practices (Nielsen and Parker ; Simpson and Rorie ; Winter and May ; Paternoster and Simpson , ). In the case of pesticide compliance, deterrence costs arise from the risk of getting caught and punished for violations, while operational costs and benefits relate to the costs of pesticides and their usage, as well as the effect they have on agricultural yield and income.…”
Section: Approach and Operationalizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, studies of compliance increasingly take a subjective approach to costs and benefits, including how regulated actors perceive certainty, celerity, and severity of sanctions (Nagin ; Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan ; Decker, Wright, and Logie ; Paternoster et al. ), as well as how they view other types of costs and benefits (Simpson and Rorie ; Winter and May ; Paternoster and Simpson , ). The subjective approach allows for an inductive understanding of how the studied actors see these costs and benefits, which is in the end what shapes their compliance decision making.…”
Section: Approach and Operationalizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
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