Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance

Ferraz, Claudio; Finan, Frederico

doi:10.3386/w14906

Cited by 217 publications

(202 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…Some studies illustrate that higher remuneration attracts bettereducated and higher-skilled individuals to politics in Italian and Brazilian local governments (e.g., Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2008;Ferraz and Finan 2009). While Keane and Merlo (2010) similarly find that lower parliamentary wage leads to a disproportional exit of highskilled politicians from the US Congress, they point out that this is not true for those who care about legislative accomplishments.…”

Section: The Regulation Of Moonlighting: the Ideal Parliament?mentioning

confidence: 88%

Moonlighting Politicians: A Survey and Research Agenda

Geys

Mäuse²

2013

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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Elected representatives in many countries are legally allowed to carry out (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate, often referred to as 'moonlighting'. Despite the important selection and incentive effects such outside positions might engender, academic studies evaluating the prevalence, desirability and/or consequences of politicians' moonlighting have remained relatively scarce; often due to severe data restrictions. In recent years, however, more stringent disclosure rules have increased data availability, and large-sample analyses are becoming increasingly feasible. Besides surveying recent empirical contributions to this developing research field, this paper also outlines unresolved issues and thereby develops an agenda for future enquiry.

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Section: The Regulation Of Moonlighting: the Ideal Parliament?mentioning

confidence: 88%

Moonlighting Politicians: A Survey and Research Agenda

Geys

Mäuse²

2013

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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“…quantity-based studies) [1], [2], [3], [4], [6]. Another group of studies utilize performance measures that are either based on quality, or quality-adjusted measures [7], [8], [9], [10], [12]. Only a few studies use several measures, based on different dimensions [4], [11].…”

Section: Quantity and Qualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The figure shows that performance is not only measurable for low-skilled jobs with routine tasks, but that it can also be measured for rather knowledgeintensive, non-routine professions, such as lawyers, physicians, or scientists. Supermarket cashiers: number of items scanned per second [3] Call agents: average length of calls [4] Lawyers: number of hours billed, new client revenue [5] Fruit pickers: kilograms of fruits picked per day [6] Academic scientists: PhD thesis gets published in top journal, number of citations [7] Academic scientists: impact factor weighted publications [8] Teachers: teacher value-added [9], [10] Paramedics: transport time, number of procedures [11] Politicians: number of submitted bills [12] Navy recruiters: number and quality of recruits [13] …”

Section: Jan Sauermann | Performance Measures and Worker Productivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Performance measures and worker productivity

Sauermann¹

2016

izawol

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in eLeVaTOr PITCHMeasuring workers' productivity is important for public policy and private-sector decision-making. Due to a lack of reliable methods to determine workers' productivity, firms often use specific performance measures, such as how different incentives affect employees' behavior. The public sector also uses these measures to monitor and evaluate personnel, such as teachers. To select the right performance measures, and as a result design better employment contracts and improve productivity, policymakers and managers need to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the available metrics. auTHOr'S maIn meSSaGeMeasures of worker productivity can give important insights into how workers perform and how workplaces should be organized. Direct measures of productivity are used to study a range of questions, such as the effects of incentives on workers' productivity, the influence of peers on behavior, or the accumulation of human capital on the job. For these and related questions, it is important to select appropriate performance measures. This choice is critical, as relying on inappropriate measures can lead to the design of inefficient incentives, poor employment contracts, or wrong policy conclusions. ConsThere is no universal definition of worker productivity; measures of worker productivity typically depend on the setting in which they are collected. Worker productivity is usually multidimensional, but it is generally not possible to measure all dimensions. If the wrong performance measures are chosen to evaluate workers, distortions can create negative effects on worker productivity. For settings in which performance is only observable at the team level, it is not always possible to estimate individual contributions to team productivity. Performance measures and worker productivityChoosing the right performance measures can inform and improve decision-making in policy and management

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“…In the same way, we expect that workers with higher and higher productivity enter the vocational market, so that we expect that the average productivity of active workers increases in the wage rate. 18 However, we are going to see that the interplay of vocation and productivity in the workers' participation constraint determines workers' willingness to accept the job, so that the counter-intuitive cases are also possible: average vocation can be increasing and average productivity can be decreasing in the wage rate.…”

Section: How the Wage Rate A¤ects The Pool Of Active Workersmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Lemons Problem in a Labor Market with Intrinsic Motivation - When Higher Salaries Pay Worse Workers

2013

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We study the Lemons Problem when workers have private information on both their skills and their intrinsic motivation. When workers are motivated, ine¢ ciencies due to adverse selection are mitigated and a change in salaries may have unexpected consequences. With a su¢ ciently strong and positive association between motivation and productivity, a wage increase may attract less motivated and also less productive workers. When the association is positive but small, it instead may attract more productive and also more motivated workers. Our theoretical analysis reconciles contrasting empirical evidence on vocational sectors such as for public servants, teachers, health professionals and politicians. Our results also inform the current policy debate on whether it is possible to improve the overall quality of workers by changing their salary.JEL Classi…cation: J24, J21, J3, D82.

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Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance

Cited by 217 publications

References 66 publications

Moonlighting Politicians: A Survey and Research Agenda

Moonlighting Politicians: A Survey and Research Agenda

Performance measures and worker productivity

The Lemons Problem in a Labor Market with Intrinsic Motivation - When Higher Salaries Pay Worse Workers

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