This paper examines the extent to which access to information enhances political accountability. Based upon the results of Brazil's recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the effect of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections. Comparing municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after, the analysis shows that the disclosure of audit results had a significant impact on the re-election rates of mayors found to be corrupt. For every additional corruption violation reported, the audit policy reduced the incumbent's likelihood of re-election by approximately 20 percent. This effect is more pronounced in municipalities where radio stations are present and higher levels of corruption are identified. These findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process, thus enabling voters to not only hold corrupt politicians accountable but also to reward non-corrupt politicians. * We are grateful to

Political institutions can affect corruption. We use audit reports from an anti-corruption program in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with re-election incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without re-election incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior.

for excellent research assistance, and to Telma Venturelli for providing the legislative census data. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior. (JEL D72, K42, O17)

and Wharton for helpful discussions and comments. We are also grateful to the Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU) for providing us with the audits data. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.