Motives to patent: Empirical evidence from Germany

Blind, Knut; Edler, Jakob; Frietsch, Rainer; Schmoch, Ulrich

doi:10.1016/j.respol.2006.03.002

Cited by 469 publications

(369 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Such a firm has " […] an incentive to produce the indicator rather than what it is supposed to indicate" (Macdonald 2001(Macdonald , 2004. The usage of patents to improve a firm's reputation has been empirically shown by Blind et al (2006) and Ramani and Kumar (2008) and, with a focus on venture capital financing, by Hsu and Ziedonis (2013) and Hoenen et al (2014).…”

Section: Changes In the Benefits Of Patentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Offensive Patent Portfolio Races

Jell¹,

Henkel²,

Wallin³

2017

Long Range Planning

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In a patent portfolio race, firms attempt to assemble a large collection of patents. Traditional explanations for patent portfolio races rest on an assumption of fragmented patent ownership where multiple unknown firms employ defensive strategies to forestall holdup. However, patent portfolio races can be observed when patent ownership is concentrated to the hands of a few firms. To explore patent portfolio races under conditions of concentrated ownership we turn to the newspaper printing machine industry, an industry characterized by a few dominant firms. Using multiple sources -patent analysis, archival data, and interviews -we identify antecedents to a phenomenon we label offensive patent portfolio races. Contrary to received wisdom, we find that patent portfolio races can be offensive, aimed at gaining rather than avoiding loss of competitive advantage. Offensive patent portfolio races hinge on the breakdown of cooperation -triggered by changes in the perceived benefits, effectiveness, and/or costs of patents, partly mediated by the adoption of a gain frame towards increased patenting, and regulated by the potential losses from further increases. We explain the behavior by invoking the folk theorem in game theory and conclude that while triggering offensive patent portfolio races may yield temporary advantages, managers are advised to tread carefully as offensive patent portfolio races may have severe implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of the innovation process.Keywords: Patent strategy, motives to patent, intellectual property, patent thickets Acknowledgments: The authors are especially grateful to Rosemarie Ziedonis, Arvids Ziedonis, Rebecca Eisenberg, Dietmar Harhoff, and members of the strategy department at Stephen M. Ross School of Business for providing valuable comments on our study. We are indebted to the Editor of Long Range Planning, Gianvito Lanzolla, and two anonymous referees for numerous suggestions that greatly improved the paper. We furthermore thank participants at various conferences for valuable comments.

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Section: Changes In the Benefits Of Patentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Offensive Patent Portfolio Races

Jell¹,

Henkel²,

Wallin³

2017

Long Range Planning

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“…As mentioned before, firstly, the choice to collaborate with academia may be an initiative driven by firm's objectives. Blind et al (2006) showed that German firms collaborate with academia for several strategic reasons. Mainly firm's expect the patents generated from collaboration to leverage their own positions in negotiations with partners, suppliers and the financial sector.…”

Section: Non-cooperators Samplementioning

confidence: 99%

Inventing and patenting activities of scientists: in the expectation of money or reputation?

2009

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We propose that scientists use patents/invention disclosures as signals to gain reputation than financial benefits. Based on a newly created dataset on the commercial activities among 2,500 scientists affiliated with 67 institutes of the German Max Planck Society, we explore the relation between the expectations of scientists concerning the outcomes of commercial activities and the likelihood of their patenting and disclosure behaviors. We find that expectation of gaining financial benefits are not related with the patenting activities of scientists without industrial cooperation. Instead, their expectation to gain/increase reputation through commercial activities is correlated with their patenting and disclosures activities. This may in turn also increase the possibility to gain academic promotion, financial benefits through industrial collaboration etc., rather than the immediate personal financial gains.

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“…As evidenced in different business surveys, certain patents, instead, are filed by firms in order to prevent others to obtain this power (Cohen et al, 2002;Duguet and Kabla, 1999;Blind et al, 2006). The use of patents aimed at preventing other parties to obtain a patent on a related invention points to the central role of patents in the technology and market strategy of firms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-emptive patenting: securing market exclusion and freedom of operation

Guellec

Martínez

Zúñiga³

2012

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

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JT03275947 STI Working Paper SeriesThe Working Paper series of the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry is designed to make available to a wider readership selected studies prepared by staff in the Directorate or by outside consultants working on OECD projects. The papers included in the series cover a broad range of issues, of both a technical and policy-analytical nature, in the areas of work of the DSTI. The Working Papers are generally available only in their original language -English or French -with a summary in the other.Comments on the papers are invited, and should be sent to the Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, OECD, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France.The opinions expressed in these papers are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the OECD or of the governments of its member countries. ABSTRACTWe investigate statistically the characteristics, functioning and incidence of pre-emptive patenting, defined as patent filings whose main effect is to hamper the grant of other patents. Patent applications can be used to prevent the grant of exclusive rights on markets and technologies to others in order to ensure freedom of operation to their holder or keep patent-less competitors out of the market. Combining data from examination outcomes and prior art at the European Patent Office (EPO), we develop a methodology to identify pre-emptive patent applications. We find evidence of pre-emption associated to patent applications cited as compromising patentability while being deemed non inventive. Furthermore, amongst them, those which are withdrawn by the applicant have the strongest pre-emptive power. The coincidence of low inventiveness and high pre-emptive impact supports the idea that some of these patents may be strategically designed by their applicants to block patenting by others. RESUMÉNous analysons statistiquement les caractéristiques, le fonctionnement et les effets des brevets préemptifs, définis comme des (demandes de) brevets dont l'effet principal est d'empêcher la délivrance d'autres brevets. Les demandes de brevets peuvent être utilisées pour empêcher la délivrance de droits exclusifs à d'autres parties sur des marchés et des technologies en vue d'assurer la liberté de manoeuvre à leur titulaire ou de maintenir des compétiteurs sans brevets à l'écart du marché. Combinant des données du résultat de l'examen et de l'art antérieur de l'Office Européen des Brevets (OEB), nous développons une méthodologie qui identifie les demandes préemptives de brevets. Nous trouvons des évidences de préemption pour des demandes de brevets citées comme compromettant la brevetabilité d'autres demandes alors qu'elles ne sont pas elles-mêmes jugés inventifs. De plus parmi elles, celles qui sont abandonnées par le demandeur lui-même ont le pouvoir préemptif le plus fort. La coïncidence de faible inventivité et de pouvoir préemptif fort suggère que certaines de ces demandes de brevets sont stratégiquement conçues par leur titulair...

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Motives to patent: Empirical evidence from Germany

Cited by 469 publications

References 16 publications

Offensive Patent Portfolio Races

Offensive Patent Portfolio Races

Inventing and patenting activities of scientists: in the expectation of money or reputation?

Pre-emptive patenting: securing market exclusion and freedom of operation

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