Moving Ourselves, Moving Others

Abstract

This book emerged as a happy coincidence. Or was it perhaps a matter of unplanned, but non-accidental "distributed cognition"? In retrospect it seems that it was something that was just waiting to happen. Based on our edited volume The Shared Mind , Tim Racine, Chris Sinha, Esa Itkonen and myself proposed a theme session with the title "Intersubjectivity and Language" to the 10th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, held in Krakow, Poland, in July 2007. At the same time, Ad Foolen and Ulrike Lüdtke independently proposed a session on " Language and Emotion". Both proposals were accepted, but we were urged to combine them, and the outcome was the stimulating whole-day workshop "Intersubjectivity and Language: The Interplay of Cognition and Emotion".The first fruit of this, at first glance coerced, synthesis was the linking of the topics of intersubjectivity and emotion. While Zlatev et al. (2008: 1, 3) had defined the first of these notions as "the sharing of experiential content (e.g. feelings, perceptions, thoughts, linguistic meanings) among a plurality of subjects" and had stated that such "sharing of experiences is not only, and not primarily, on a cognitive level, but also (and more basically) on the level of affect, perceptual processes and conative (action-oriented) engagements" -emotion was not explicitly thematized in that predecessor to the present volume. This was clearly a blind spot in the programmatic attempt to frame the concept of intersubjectivity as an alternative to the cognitivist perspective of "theory of mind", which still dominates large parts of the field of social cognition.A second, and equally important, insight that emerged from the workshop was the close link between (inter)subjectivity and bodily motion, or movement. Again, it is not that 3) had neglected the essential role of the body and its various forms of "movements" for the understanding of self and others: "Such sharing and understanding are based on embodied interaction (e.g. empathic perception, imitation, gesture and practical collaboration)." Similarly, various traditions I wish to thank my co-editors for several rounds of feedback on this text, which was initially intended to serve as a joint introduction. However, since I wrote it myself, and allowed myself in the capacity of "coherence manager" to make some critical observations, to which not all co-editors could subscribe, it was decided to re-organize it as a single-authored Prologue. I also wish to express my gratitude to the authors for the discussions on their chapters, and my sincere hope that even if they disagree with my comments, they would not take this negatively, but as an attempt to add to the coherence of the book and to open up the discussion on the topics that we all care about so deeply. Finally, I need to acknowledge the six year program Centre for Cognitive Semiotics (2009-2014) at Lund University, for financial support and for providing an intellectual environment aiming at the development of a non-reductive, synthetic "mind science".

‘I’m dying on you’

“…Majid (2014) emphasises the use of different linguistic means, rather than simply emotion terms, in the expression of emotions. By referring to cross-linguistic data, she argues that every level of the language, from intonation to words, to complex constructions, to metaphors, etc., is significant for the expression of emotions (see also Foolen, 2012).…”

Towards a Model of Leader Character Development: Insights From Anatomy and Music Therapy

“…Emotions arise from an individual's perspective of their situation, whether it is immediate, imagined, or recalled (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Emotions are triggered by stimuli, which set off an influx of physiological, behavioral, and experiential responses (Ekman, 1992;Foolen et al, 2012). Emotions unfold over relatively short time periods, usually occur in an instance that is personal or meaningful, and invoke a conscious or unconscious reaction (e.g., facial expression) (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003;Fredrickson, 2001).…”

“…For example, drive would be compromised if a person relies predominantly on the cognitive system and does not reap the benefits that a coherent affect and physiological system provides. Passion is not a purely cognitive endeavor since passion and affect cue cognition (Foolen et al, 2012). Vitality implicates physiology, for without a coherent physiological system to support it, the expression of vitality will be both limited and compromised (McCraty & Zayas, 2014).…”

“…For instance, people with posttraumatic stress disorder experience changes in their psychological responses (cognition) but no longer have the ability to temper their physiological responses to stress (Leeds, 2009). Chronic states cause acts of indecisiveness, hesitancy, and the inability to focus (Leeds, 2009)the result of chemicals in the blood and the condition of the nervous system affecting the ability to sense and think (Foolen et al, 2012). Chronic stress and anxiety disorders are associated with persistent physiological changes (Hölzel et al, 2010).…”