It is being increasingly recognized that the Saussurean dictum of “the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign” is in conflict with the pervasiveness of the phenomenon commonly known as “sound symbolism”. After first presenting a historical overview of the debate, however, we conclude that both positions have been exaggerated, and that an adequate explanation of sound symbolism is still lacking. How can there, for example, be (perceived) similarity between expressions and contents across different sensory modalities? We offer an answer, based on the Peircian notion of iconic ground, and G. Sonesson’s distinction between primary and secondary iconicity. Furthermore, we describe an experimental study, in a paradigm first pioneered by W. Köhler, and recently popularized by V. Ramachandran, in which we varied vowels and consonants in fictive word-forms, and conclude that both types of sounds play a role in perceiving an iconic ground between the word-forms and visual figures. The combination of historical conceptual analysis, semiotic explication and psychological experimentation presented in this article is characteristic of the emerging paradigm of cognitive semiotics.

We propose reframing one of the key questions in the field of language evolution as what was the original human-specific communicative system? With the help of cognitive semiotics, first we clarify the difference between signals, which characterize animal communication, and signs, which do not replace but complement signals in human communication. We claim that the evolution of bodily mimesis allowed for the use of signs, and the social-cognitive skills needed to support them to emerge in hominin evolution. Neither signs nor signals operate single-handedly, but as part of semiotic systems. Communicative systems can be either monosemiotic or polysemiotic—the former consisting of a single semiotic system and the latter, of several. Our proposal is that pantomime, as the original human-specific communicative system, should be characterized as polysemiotic: dominated by gesture but also including vocalization, facial expression, and possibly the rudiments of depiction. Given that pantomimic gestures must have been maximally similar to bodily actions, we characterize them as typically (1) dominated by iconicity, (2) of the primary kind, (3) involving the whole body, (4) performed from a first-person perspective, (5) concerning peripersonal space, and (6) using the Enacting mode of representation.

This chapter presents an evolutionary and developmental model, according to which intersubjectivity is intimately tied to bodily mimesisthe use of the body for communicative and representational purposesto an extent that it can be said to co-evolve with it. I review some relevant primate evidence which shows that feral and captive apes are capable of the first two levels (involving e.g. empathy, shared attention and imitation), but not of the third level which involves an understanding of communicative signs, i.e. triadic mimesis. Enculturated language-trained apes, on the other hand, show some aspects of triadic mimesis, suggesting how our predecessors could have bootstrapped themselves to this level without language (and without a "theory of mind"). The emergence of language, on the other hand, openes the way to the highest two levels of intersubjectivity, bringing forth the understanding of "beliefs" and the use of folk psychology.

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We discuss four interconnected issues that we believe have hindered investigations into how language may affect thinking. These have had a tendency to reappear in the debate concerning linguistic relativity over the past decades, despite numerous empirical findings. The first is the claim that it is impossible to disentangle language from thought, making the question concerning “influence” pointless. The second is the argument that it is impossible to disentangle language from culture in general, and from social interaction in particular, so it is impossible to attribute any differences in the thought patterns of the members of different cultures to language per se. The third issue is the objection that methodological and empirical problems defeat all but the most trivial version of the thesis of linguistic influence: that language gives new factual information. The fourth is the assumption that since language can potentially influence thought from “not at all” to “completely,” the possible forms of linguistic influence can be placed on a cline, and competing theories can be seen as debating the actual position on this cline. We analyze these claims and show that the first three do not constitute in-principle objections against the validity of the project of investigating linguistic influence on thought, and that the last one is not the best way to frame the empirical challenges at hand. While we do not argue for any specific theory or mechanism for linguistic influence on thought, our discussion and the reviewed literature show that such influence is clearly possible, and hence in need of further investigations.