Multi-asset minority games

Abstract

We study analytically and numerically Minority Games in which agents may invest in different assets (or markets), considering both the canonical and the grand-canonical versions. We find that the likelihood of agents trading in a given asset depends on the relative amount of information available in that market. More specifically, in the canonical game players play preferentially in the stock with less information. The same holds in the grand canonical game when agents have positive incentives to trade, whereas when agents payoff are solely related to their speculative ability they display a larger propensity to invest in the information-rich asset. Furthermore, in this model one finds a globally predictable phase with broken ergodicity

Multi-Market Minority Game: Breaking the Symmetry of Choice

“…Therefore, the symmetry breaking observed in Ref. 8 is not a spontaneous one, contrary to our model where the sizes of information pools are equal. To be more specific, we recall the notation used by the authors of Ref.…”

“…the artificial asymmetry of the µ pools, is responsible for the market split observed in Ref. 8. Therefore, the symmetry breaking observed in Ref.…”

Statistical mechanics of competitive resource allocation using agent-based models

“…To understand why this happens, one has to take the point of view of the agents, i.e., of their perception of the world, which is nothing else than Eq. (11). The fluctuations of the score of agents i and j become correlated via their noise terms if the strength of the latter becomes comparable to that of their payoffs, i.e., when K ΓJ i,j σ 2 /N = H/P , where K is a proportionality factor.…”

Controlling herding in minority game systems

“…The agents who pick the minority resource are rewarded, and those belonging to the majority group are punished due to limited resources. The MG dynamics has been studied extensively in the past 21 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 .…”