Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits

Dobzinski, Shahar; Lavi, Ron; Nisan, Noam

doi:10.1109/focs.2008.39

Cited by 77 publications

(149 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…The goal is now to get a Pareto optimal allocation, rather than approximating the social welfare. They show that the adaptive clinching auction of Dobzinski et al [19] actually achieves this, in the adversarial arrival model. This auction is truthful, and payments can be computed online too.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 91%

Truthful Multi-Parameter Auctions with Online Supply: an Impossible Combination

Devanur

Sivan

Syrgkanis

2018

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

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We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. The auctioneer has to decide the allocation of an item immediately after each item arrives, but is allowed to compute payments after knowing how many items arrived. For this problem we show that there is no deterministic truthful and individually rational mechanism that, even with unbounded computational resources, gets any finite approximation factor to the optimal social welfare.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 91%

Truthful Multi-Parameter Auctions with Online Supply: an Impossible Combination

Devanur

Sivan

Syrgkanis

2018

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

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“…Although there are similar uniqueness results for the single good setting in the literature (for example, Dobzinski et al 2012, for two players), analysis in the single-good setting is useful in illustrating important concepts and proof techniques that are useful for more general settings. Considering multiple goods, I start with the domain where bidders are single-minded, i.e., each bidder values only a specific bundle.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…If the mechanism must be robust to the beliefs of bidders, one cannot attain optimality, constrained efficiency, or ex post efficiency, but can hope for a weaker notion of efficiency: Pareto optimality. Dobzinski et al (2012) study a multi-good setting and show that when bidders are budget-constrained and budgets are private information, there is no incentive compatible Pareto optimal auction. They propose the adaptive clinching auction, a modification of the clinching auction in Ausubel (2004), and show that it satisfies Pareto optimality, individual rationality, and incentive compatibility when budgets are known.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors also design an asymptotically revenue-maximizing truthful mechanism that may allocate only some of the items. In the general valuation environment, there is no mechanism that is Pareto optimal and incentive compatible, sometimes even with publicly known budgets (Goel et al 2015, Dobzinski et al 2012, Fiat et al 2011, Lavi and May 2012.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions

2018

Theoretical Economics

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This paper studies the possibility of implementing Pareto optimal outcomes in the combinatorial auction setting where bidders may have budget constraints. I show that when the setting involves a single good, or multiple goods but with singleminded bidders, there is a unique mechanism, called truncation Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG), that is individually rational, incentive compatible, and Pareto optimal. Truncation VCG works by first truncating valuations at budgets, and then implementing standard VCG on the truncated valuations. I also provide maximal domain results, characterizing when it is possible to implement Pareto optimal outcomes and, if so, providing an implementing mechanism. Whenever there is at least one multi-minded constrained bidder and another multi-minded bidder, implementation is impossible. For any other domain, however, implementation is possible.

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“…It turns out this is necessary, a perhaps surprising result as having budgets publicly known was necessary for truthful mechanisms in related work [10,2].…”

Section: Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Stability of Generalized Second Price Auctions with Budgets

Dı́az

Giotis

Kirousis

et al. 2014

LATIN 2014: Theoretical Informatics

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Abstract. The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets.

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Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits

Cited by 77 publications

References 5 publications

Truthful Multi-Parameter Auctions with Online Supply: an Impossible Combination

Truthful Multi-Parameter Auctions with Online Supply: an Impossible Combination

Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions

On the Stability of Generalized Second Price Auctions with Budgets

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