Multiple Realizability

Abstract

Multiple realizability, the claim that a type of mental state is implemented in a variety of distinct types of physical states, is the central premise in the most influential criticism of mind‐to‐brain reductionist programs. But the validity of this argument is under increasing scrutiny, based both on examples from more mature branches of science and on specific developments in the cognitive and brain sciences.

Towards a computational theory of experience

“…It seems to us that a reasonable explanatory framework should be highly exclusive, while being general enough to include non-human (and possibly machine) intelligence. A computational framework is by definition multiply realizable (Chalmers, 1994;Bickle, 2006), hence is more in danger of being too inclusive. Therefore, to be plausible it must be accompanied by strict conditions on implementation (to forestall, among other things, the objection from funny instantiation (Maudlin, 1989), used for example by Searle in his -Wordstar‖ argument (1990)).…”

Why the social sciences are irreducible

“…Philosophers often speak of property realization, but they rarely explain in detail what this is supposed to mean (this goes for the Fodorian explanatory holists as well) (see e.g. Bickle 2013). However, I see two possible interpretations of this notion in this context, one loose and one more specific.…”

Psychological categories as homologies: lessons from ethology

“…According to functionalism, psychological states that mediate a similar pattern of physiological and behavioral inputs and outputs belong to the same psychological category (Bickle 2006 In a series of writings, Griffiths (1994Griffiths ( , 1997Griffiths ( , 2007 and Matthen (1998Matthen ( , 2000Matthen ( , 2002 argue that homology thinking is a better way to investigate psychological categories than functionalism. Homology thinking is a general approach in In many cases, homology-based explanations are preferable to analogy-based explanations.…”

“…The 1970s and 1980s also saw the rise of functionalist accounts of psychological traits in philosophy and cognitive science. Functionalists suggest that instances of a psychological category are identified by their mediating a similar pattern of 3 physiological and behavioral inputs and outputs (Bickle 2006). Functionalists, like their evolutionary counterparts, are interested in the function a psychological state performs.…”