This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear "ruthlessly reductive" results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the discipline's cell-physiological and molecular-biological core.

As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a "ruthless reductionism" is alive and thriving in "molecular and cellular cognition"-a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot explain cognition and complex behavior directly. These experimental practices involve intervening directly with molecular components of sub-cellular and gene expression pathways in neurons and then measuring specific behaviors. These behaviors are tracked using tests that are widely accepted by experimental psychologists to study the psychological phenomenon at issue (e.g., memory, attention, and perception). Here I illustrate these practices and their importance for explanation and reduction in current mainstream neuroscience by describing recent work on social recognition memory in mammals.

John Bickle presents a new type of reductionism, one that is stronger than one-way dependency yet sidesteps the arguments that sank classical reductionism. One of the central problems in the philosophy of psychology is an updated version of the old mind-body problem: how levels of theories in the behavioral and brain sciences relate to one another. Many contemporary philosophers of mind believe that cognitive-psychological theories are not reducible to neurological theories. However, this antireductionism has not spawned a revival of dualism. Instead, most nonreductive physicalists prefer the idea of a one-way dependence of the mental on the physical. In Psychoneural Reduction, John Bickle presents a new type of reductionism, one that is stronger than one-way dependency yet sidesteps the arguments that sank classical reductionism. Although he makes some concessions to classical antireductionism, he argues for a relationship between psychology and neurobiology that shares some of the key aims, features, and consequences of classical reductionism. Parts of Bickle's "new wave" reductionism have emerged piecemeal over the past two decades; this is his first comprehensive statement and defense of it to appear. Bradford Books imprint

Thomas Kuhn’s famous model of the components and dynamics of scientific revolutions is still dominant to this day across science, philosophy, and history. The guiding philosophical theme of this article is that, concerning actual revolutions in neuroscience over the past 60 years, Kuhn’s account is wrong. There have been revolutions, and new ones are brewing, but they do not turn on competing paradigms, anomalies, or the like. Instead, they turn exclusively on the development of new experimental tools. I adopt a metascientific approach and examine in detail the development of two recent neuroscience revolutions: the impact of engineered genetically mutated mammals in the search for causal mechanisms of “higher” cognitive functions; and the more recent impact of optogenetics and designer receptors exclusively activated by designer drugs (DREADDs). The two key metascientific concepts, I derive from these case studies are a revolutionary new tool’s motivating problem, and its initial and second-phase hook experiments. These concepts hardly exhaust a detailed metascience of tool development experiments in neuroscience, but they get that project off to a useful start and distinguish the subsequent account of neuroscience revolutions clearly from Kuhn’s famous model. I close with a brief remark about the general importance of molecular biology for a current philosophical understanding of science, as comparable to the place physics occupied when Kuhn formulated his famous theory of scientific revolutions.

Multiple realizability, the claim that a type of mental state is implemented in a variety of distinct types of physical states, is the central premise in the most influential criticism of mind‐to‐brain reductionist programs. But the validity of this argument is under increasing scrutiny, based both on examples from more mature branches of science and on specific developments in the cognitive and brain sciences.