Precis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account

Bickle, John

doi:10.1007/s11097-005-4066-2

Cited by 147 publications

(212 citation statements)

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“…: "*V+is-à-vis explanations of behavior, neurological theories specify mechanisms and psychological theories do not" (Fodor 1965, 177) Our rejection of the autonomy of psychological explanation should not be confused with a rejection of multiple realizability or an endorsement of reductionism. Several authors argue that functional or psychological properties are not multiply realizable-or that if functional or psychological properties are multiply realizable, then they are not natural kinds (Bechtel 2009;Bechtel and Mundale 1999;Bickle 2003Bickle , 2006P.M. Churchland 2007;Couch 2005;Kim 1992;Polger 2004Polger , 2009Shagrir 2008;Shapiro 2000Shapiro , 2004.…”

Section: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience Via Multi-level Mechmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

2011

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Synthese; Synthese is available online at:http://www.springer.com/philosophy/epistemology+and+philosophy+of+science/jou rnal/11229Abstract. We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations.1 This paper was refereed in two rounds. John Symons graciously arranged for a round of blind refereeing; thanks are due to him and the anonymous referees. In addition, thanks to those who refereed the paper non-blindly: Ken Aizawa, Robert Cummins, and Dan Weiskopf. Many thanks to audiences at the 2010 APA Pacific Division, Saint Louis University, and University of Missouri -Columbia. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES-0924527 to Gualtiero Piccinini. 2 Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience via Multi-Level Mechanistic ExplanationWhen psychologists explain behavior, the explanations typically make reference to causes that precede the behavior and make a difference to whether and how it occurs.For instance, they explain that Anna ducked because she saw a looming ball. By contrast, when psychologists explain psychological capacities such as stereopsis or working memory, they typically do so by showing that these complex capacities are made up of more basic capacities organized together. In this paper, we focus exclusively on the latter sort of explanation, which is usually referred to as functional analysis. We argue that such decompositional, constitutive explanations gain their explanatory force by describing mechanisms (even approximately and with idealization) and, conversely, that they lack explanatory force to the extent that they fail to describe mechanisms.In arguing for this point, we sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be and in some cases have been integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations. 3The conclusion that functional analyses are mechanism sketches leads to a simple argument that psychological explanation is mechanistic. It is generally assumed that psychological explanation is functional-that it proceeds via t...

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Section: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience Via Multi-level Mechmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Churchland 1986, Bickle 2003. In response, others have defended the multiple realizability of functional or psychological properties, usually in conjunction with a defense of the autonomy of psychology Gillett 2009, 2011, forthcoming;Block 1997;Figdor 2010;Fodor 1997;Gold and Stoljar 1999).…”

Section: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience Via Multi-level Mechmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

2011

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“…1 a The multiple realisation hypothesis, b kind splitting, and c realiser unification/merging Despite its popularity, the multiply realisability thesis has also been facing persistent criticism (e.g. Bechtel and Mundale 1999;Bickle 1998Bickle , 2003Polger and Shapiro 2016;Shapiro 2000). One core aspect of the criticism can be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the realisers of the purportedly multiply realised entity must be identical, for they are all realising the same entity, in which case the realised entity is not differently realised after all; on the other hand, the realisers must differ from each other, for the realised entity should be differently realised, in which case there is no single entity to be multiply realised (cf.…”

Section: Neuroprosthetics and Mental Causationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental causation via neuroprosthetics? A critical analysis

Pernu

2018

Synthese

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Some recent arguments defending the genuine causal efficacy of the mental have been relying on empirical research on neuroprosthetics. This essay presents a critical analysis of these arguments. The problem of mental causation, and the basic idea and results of neuroprosthetics are reviewed. It is shown how appealing to the research on neuroprosthetics can be interpreted to give support to the idea of mental causation. However, it does so only in a rather deflationary sense: by holding the mental identical with the neural. So contrary to what the arguments have been assuming, neuroprosthetics cannot be used to argue for nonreductive physicalism. It can rather be taken to illustrate just the opposite: how the mental and the physical are identical.

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“…From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, it was beleaguered by numerous philosophical challenges, including concerns over multiple realizability, violations of Leibniz's law and the modal logic of identity statements, and the apparent incorrigibility of introspective reports. 2 Since the early 1990s, examinations of case studies and actual scientific practice have become equally important prongs in both challenges to, and defenses of, philosophical theses about mind/ brain relationships (Bickle, 2003); but unfortunately, traditional identity theorists have had a paucity of cases of psychoneural identities to celebrate.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

HIT and brain reward function: A case of mistaken identity (theory)

Wright

Colombo

Beard

2017

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in

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a b s t r a c tThis paper employs a case study from the history of neurosciencedbrain reward functiondto scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called 'Heuristic Identity Theory' (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why other case studies previously thought to provide empirical support for HIT also fold under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different ways of understanding the types of identity claims presupposed by HIT and considering other conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alternative to the traditional identity theory so much as a relabeling of previously discussed strategies for mechanistic discovery.

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Precis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account

Cited by 147 publications

References 4 publications

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

Mental causation via neuroprosthetics? A critical analysis

HIT and brain reward function: A case of mistaken identity (theory)

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