Reducing mind to molecular pathways: explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience

Bickle, John

doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9015-2

Cited by 134 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…: "*V+is-à-vis explanations of behavior, neurological theories specify mechanisms and psychological theories do not" (Fodor 1965, 177) Our rejection of the autonomy of psychological explanation should not be confused with a rejection of multiple realizability or an endorsement of reductionism. Several authors argue that functional or psychological properties are not multiply realizable-or that if functional or psychological properties are multiply realizable, then they are not natural kinds (Bechtel 2009;Bechtel and Mundale 1999;Bickle 2003Bickle , 2006P.M. Churchland 2007;Couch 2005;Kim 1992;Polger 2004Polger , 2009Shagrir 2008;Shapiro 2000Shapiro , 2004.…”

Section: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience Via Multi-level Mechmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

2011

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Synthese; Synthese is available online at:http://www.springer.com/philosophy/epistemology+and+philosophy+of+science/jou rnal/11229Abstract. We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations.1 This paper was refereed in two rounds. John Symons graciously arranged for a round of blind refereeing; thanks are due to him and the anonymous referees. In addition, thanks to those who refereed the paper non-blindly: Ken Aizawa, Robert Cummins, and Dan Weiskopf. Many thanks to audiences at the 2010 APA Pacific Division, Saint Louis University, and University of Missouri -Columbia. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES-0924527 to Gualtiero Piccinini. 2 Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience via Multi-Level Mechanistic ExplanationWhen psychologists explain behavior, the explanations typically make reference to causes that precede the behavior and make a difference to whether and how it occurs.For instance, they explain that Anna ducked because she saw a looming ball. By contrast, when psychologists explain psychological capacities such as stereopsis or working memory, they typically do so by showing that these complex capacities are made up of more basic capacities organized together. In this paper, we focus exclusively on the latter sort of explanation, which is usually referred to as functional analysis. We argue that such decompositional, constitutive explanations gain their explanatory force by describing mechanisms (even approximately and with idealization) and, conversely, that they lack explanatory force to the extent that they fail to describe mechanisms.In arguing for this point, we sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be and in some cases have been integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations. 3The conclusion that functional analyses are mechanism sketches leads to a simple argument that psychological explanation is mechanistic. It is generally assumed that psychological explanation is functional-that it proceeds via t...

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Section: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience Via Multi-level Mechmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

2011

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“…Of these three, it would be the first which directly causes a change in phenomenology, but also genetic or neurochemical mechanisms should be studied on the molecular level in order to understand and/or intervene with the structure of phenomenology. One view that is consistent with this is the "ruthless reductionism" proposed in [5]. There is, however, also another view which emphasizes the importance of molecular levels of organization without appealing to overly-strong versions of reductionism: Living cells, such as neurons, arise from complex arrangements and interactions between molecules, and, accordingly, all biology has a chemical basis.…”

Section: Molecular Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Consciousness: A Molecular Perspective

Prentner

2017

Philosophies

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This perspective examines the role of chemistry and molecular biology for a science of consciousness. Opposed to the consensus view, we argue that the molecular organization of biological systems is key to arrive at a thorough understanding of the dynamics correlated to the phenomenology of consciousness in complex organisms. This is indicated by the fact that the molecular sciences either provide one or more mechanisms directly related to phenomenology or otherwise describe the dynamics of the underlying substrate. In addition, we discuss substrate-independence in information-processing theories of consciousness and the issue of combination in panpsychist theories of consciousness, both from the angle of the molecular sciences. In any case, molecular details matter.Keywords: consciousness studies; molecular mechanism; substrate independence; supervenience; information-processing theories; panpsychism A Molecular Basis for Consciousness?When trying to answer the question how to fit consciousness into a naturalist image of the world, there are different explanatory strategies one could pursue [1] 1 . Many exclusively believe in either (cognitive) neuroscience or fundamental physics to advance the science of consciousness. Unfortunately, this sometimes leads to a neglect of the molecular picture that underlies the former and emerges from the latter. Taking the molecular perspective as advocated here also sharpens one's appreciation of problematic issues in consciousness studies that might otherwise be overlooked all too easily.Most popular among many working in the field is the idea that consciousness is a (structural or systemic) property of information-processing networks. This is exemplified by many neurobiological [2], functional [3], or information-processing [4] theories of consciousness. The role of chemistry, accordingly, lies in supporting the relevant neurobiological and computational substrate: Consciousness has a chemical basis; but the right level to look for a mechanism that "gives rise" or "correlates" to the contents of consciousness is not the molecular level itself but the level of, e.g., assemblies of neurons in the brain. Instead of providing molecular mechanisms, chemistry plays the role of materially grounding the corresponding theories of consciousness.We shall argue that limiting chemistry and molecular biology to a supportive role is deficient. In particular, we wish to stress the importance of taking the concrete molecular picture into account when trying to explain the way in which the content of consciousness-its "phenomenology"-is shaped. To this aim, we shall look at three issues in consciousness studies and emphasize the role of the molecular dynamics involved: First, we shall consider possible mechanisms at the molecular level, which we put into the context of reduction and supervenience. Second, the role 1 Different strategies are not exclusively linked to particular philosophical positions. We shall discuss the prospects of physicalism and panpsychism in this article, be...

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“…As evidential support for his claims, Bickle (2006) describes research that purportedly establishes a role for a cyclic-AMP response element binding protein (CREB) in social recognition memory. As I have criticized Bickle's treatment of this case previously (Sullivan 2009), I will not consider it here.…”

Section: A Minimal Versus a Substantivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The self-proclaimed "radical-reductionist" John Bickle (2006), for example, may be interpreted as claiming that notions of representation play at best a heuristic role in cognitive neurobiology. On his account, cognitive neurobiology is what he dubs "reductive-in-practice," insofar as practitioners import learning paradigms from experimental psychology and use them to operationally define types of memory in terms of observable changes in behavior.…”

Section: A Minimal Versus a Substantivementioning

confidence: 99%

A Role for Representation in Cognitive Neurobiology

Sullivan

2010

Philos. of Sci.

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What role does the concept of representation play in the contexts of experimentation and explanation in cognitive neurobiology? In this article, a distinction is drawn between minimal and substantive roles for representation. It is argued by appeal to a case study that representation currently plays a role in cognitive neurobiology somewhere in between minimal and substantive and that this is problematic given the ultimate explanatory goals of cognitive neurobiological research. It is suggested that what is needed is for representation to instead play a substantive role.

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Reducing mind to molecular pathways: explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience

Cited by 134 publications

References 39 publications

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

Consciousness: A Molecular Perspective

A Role for Representation in Cognitive Neurobiology

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