Muscular Imaginings—A Phenomenological and Enactive Model for Imagination

Ilundáin-Agurruza, Jesús

doi:10.1080/17511321.2017.1294197

Cited by 13 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Rather, the learner is seen as someone depicted (by the nonenactivists) as “jerking” between a string of “deliberate practices” (Robertson & Hutto, 2022). Anders Ericsson, the originator of the idea of “deliberate practice,” says that Csikszentmihalyi (1990) “flow” (or “mushin,” in Japanese) is “incompatible with deliberate practice” (Ericsson & Ward, 2007, p. 349); it is, however, central to radical enactivist accounts (Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2017; Krein & Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2017). Radical enactivists suggest that context-sensitive habits are the building blocks of skilled performance and that they become part of the flow due to imagination.…”

Section: Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Radical enactivism: A guide for the perplexed.

Drury¹,

Tudor²

2024

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the last 20 years, cognitive science has been revolutionized by enactive cognition. However, claims by enactivists that enactive cognition reforms much of our thinking about the nature of minds, and our relationships with nature and each other, have not always been easy to follow and hence a certain perplexity which has been further confounded by arguments between various enactivists. This article offers some clarification of some of the central claims of enactivism by drawing on past figures in philosophy and psychology, borrowing and extending already popularized metaphors, elucidating some key concepts, and explicating one of the central arguments within enactivism. Combining relevant inferences and intuitions from the past with recent ones from radical enactivism facilitates the emergence of a more responsible and responsive understanding of human nature: one that allows us to attune to each other and to nature more fully. Public Significance StatementOne of a number of approaches to embodied cognition, radical enactivism emphasizes the fact that our fast, intuitive, animal thinking mostly dominates our slower, social linguistic thinking. Separating and reintegrating the two furthers the pioneering work undertaken by Wittgenstein and holds the promise of rectifying our alienation from each other and from nature. This article discusses this important development in cognitive science.

show abstract

Section: Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Radical enactivism: A guide for the perplexed.

Drury¹,

Tudor²

2024

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Before climbing, he spends 2 days "sitting and thinking, hour after hour. Visualising every single move, everything that could possibly happen" (Honnold and Roberts, 2016;Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2017). Honnold's imagining process is a case of CI, since it is not only pictorial, but it involves kinetic, tactile, kinesthetic, nociceptive, and other sensory modalities that are deeply embodied in nature (see Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2017).…”

Section: Switching Paradigm: Embodying Mind Wanderingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Visualising every single move, everything that could possibly happen" (Honnold and Roberts, 2016;Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2017). Honnold's imagining process is a case of CI, since it is not only pictorial, but it involves kinetic, tactile, kinesthetic, nociceptive, and other sensory modalities that are deeply embodied in nature (see Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2017). Furthermore, eidetic imagining is, according to Ilundáin-Agarruza, dependent on corporeal imagining (see also Dewey, 1980).…”

Section: Switching Paradigm: Embodying Mind Wanderingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mind wandering in reading: An embodied approach

Trasmundi

Toro²

2023

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the last 20 years, the study of mind wandering has attracted the attention of a growing number of researchers from fields like psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience. Mind wandering has been characterized in multiple ways: as task-unrelated, unintentional, stimulus-independent, or unguided thought processes. Those accounts have mostly focused on the identification of neurocognitive mechanisms that enable the emergence of mind-wandering episodes. Reading is one activity in which mind wandering frequently occurs, and it is widely accepted that mind wandering is detrimental for reading flow, comprehension and the capacity to make inferences based on the text. This mind wandering scepsis in reading is based on two unchallenged views: (i) that reading is a disembodied, mental activity of information processing, and (ii) that mind wandering is essentially characterized as a task-unrelated and involuntary thought process that disrupts all kinds of goal-oriented behavior. However, recent developments within cognitive science treat the mind as embodied and thus challenge both ontological and epistemological assumptions about what mind wandering is, where it is located, and how it is being studied empirically during reading. In this article we integrate embodied accounts of mind wandering and reading to show how reading benefits from nested mind wandering processes. Empirically, we investigate how a reader can move successfully in and out of different embodied processes and mesh different cognitive strategies over time, including some forms of mind wandering. While such changes in reading are frequently deemed dysfunctional, we suggest an alternative interpretation: Rather than seeking constant flow and fluency, we propose that reading is multi-actional and benefits from drawing on different cognitive strategies spanning mind wandering processes and goal-oriented behavior. In that sense, we suggest that mind wandering has a potential for enriching cognitive processes underlying reading, such as imagining and reflection. We exemplify these insights through analyses of data obtained in ethnographic and semi-experimental studies of reading practices. We conclude that to capture cognitive phenomena within an embodied framework, a richer methodology must be developed. Such a methodology must not only be capable of accounting for brains, bodies, and contexts in isolation, but must consider an overall brain-body-environment system.

show abstract

“…Enactivism also works with findings from neuroscience, where mental imagery is characterized not as a representational process, but as a motoric, bodily process involving neuronal activation and engaging bodily movements (Jeannerod, 1997;Driskell et al, 1994;Guillot et al, 2012;see Gallagher & Rucińska, 2021). Available proposals for embodied and enactive imagination (Hutto, 2015;Hutto & Myin, 2013Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2017;Medina, 2013) treat imagination as a form of action that is strongly integrated with perceiving, involves implicit embodied sensorimotor processes, and is densely textured in a cross-modal (kinetic, tactile, kinesthetic and olfactory) way. Thus, the imaginative processes, including mental imagery, are seen by enactivists as grounded in embodied motor activations, which can further explain re-enactments in pretend play.…”

Section: The Mind Of the Pretendermentioning

confidence: 99%

Pretense as alternative sense-making: a praxeological enactivist account

Weichold

Rucińska

2021

Phenom Cogn Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The project of this paper is to synthesize enactivist cognitive science and practice theory in order to develop a new account of pretend play. Pretend play is usually conceived of as a representationalist phenomenon where a pretender projects a fictional mental representation onto reality. It thus seems that pretense can only be explained in representationalist terms. In this paper, we oppose this usual approach. We instead propose not only new explanatory tools for pretend play, but also a fundamental reconceptualization of the phenomena of pretend play, that is, of the very explanandum of theories of pretense. To do so, we suggest combining the turn to action and embodiment in the cognitive sciences with the practice turn in the humanities. From our point of view, pretend play has to be seen in its role in human life as a whole, which is to help children to learn to master the complex sociocultural contingencies of the manifold social practices that make up social reality. Pretend play should therefore be conceived as alternative sense-making that is always related, in varying ways, to ordinary social practices. Pretenders do not need to project mental representations onto reality, but make sense of their surroundings in different ways than encultured adults in ordinary practices. In the paper, we spell out this view and show how it enables an enactivist reconceptualization of imagination, intentions and knowledge, which are usually thought of as being available only to representationalist accounts of pretense.

show abstract

Muscular Imaginings—A Phenomenological and Enactive Model for Imagination

Cited by 13 publications

References 18 publications

Radical enactivism: A guide for the perplexed.

Radical enactivism: A guide for the perplexed.

Mind wandering in reading: An embodied approach

Pretense as alternative sense-making: a praxeological enactivist account

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About