Must phenomenology remain Cartesian?

Romano, Claude

doi:10.1007/s11007-012-9229-6

Cited by 27 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Similarly for the idea that the contents of perceptual experiences are de re (McDowell 1994), a view that has been attributed to Husserl (A.D. Smith 2008;D. Smith and McIntyre 1982; but see Romano 2012;Staiti 2015). Notice, however, that on such views the content is what bears the relation.…”

Section: Motivating Naïve Realismmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…Only a very small number of philosophers with a footing in phenomenology who work on perception appear to endorse the relational view, and they seem to have arrived at it independently and not in response to historical antecedents or more recent defenses of the idea in Anglo-American philosophy (Smith 1984;Mulligan and Smith 1986;Romano 2011Romano , 2012Romano , 2015. It has also received some skeptical (Hopp 2011(Hopp , 2014 or noncommittal (Overgaard 2013) discussion.…”

Section: Situating Phenomenology In Relation To the Current Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

“…That may or may not count as a relative disadvantage for Daubert's view in comparison to Husserl's. It is been argued that Husserl accepts the common factor view (and that this is problematic) (Romano 2012), that he is a disjunctivist (A. D. Smith 2008), and that he opts for some third option besides disjunctivism and the common factor view (Staiti 2015). So, in this dialectical context, given the apparent ambiguity of Husserl's position and the plethora of attempts to formulate a satisfactory naïve realist account of illusion and hallucination, it is not necessarily problematic for the naïve realist to leave no room for perceptual error.…”

Section: A First Divergence: Perceptual Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

Bower

2019

Grazer Philos. Stud.

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Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy.

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Section: Motivating Naïve Realismmentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Situating Phenomenology In Relation To the Current Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A First Divergence: Perceptual Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

Bower

2019

Grazer Philos. Stud.

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“…Smith made this suggestion with trepidation, stating the he feared many would regard his proposal as ‘silly’. And indeed, despite some qualified support for Smith's thesis, the majority of commentators agree that Husserl could not have been a disjunctivist (Bower, 2020; Cimino, 2021; Romano, 2012; Staiti, 2015). 5 However, the anti‐disjunctivist readers disagree among themselves over the correct characterization of Husserl's positive views.…”

Section: Husserl: An Ongoing Controversymentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenologists on Perception and Hallucination: Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty

Overgaard

2022

Philosophy Compass

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There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve realists), on the one hand, and 'conjunctivists' (intentionalists), on the other.For more than a decade, scholars of phenomenology have debated how classical phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are to be located vis-à-vis this chasm.While there seems to be an emerging consensus that Merleau-Ponty was a disjunctivist avant la lettre, how to interpret Husserl remains contested.

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“…Para un argumento a este efecto, véase Romano (2012). Para una crítica a la lectura de Romano, véase Staiti (2015).…”

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La fenomenología de la percepción en Spinoza

Hugo

2018

Rev. filos.

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En este artículo desafío la aseveración sostenida por Peden (2014) y Brandt (2011) de que la filosofía de Spinoza es esencialmente incompatible con ciertas posiciones fundamentales de la fenomenología. Contra eso, sostengo que lo que Spinoza llama la imaginación se asemeja a la percepción en la fenomenología de Merleau-Ponty. Se justifica esa tesis a partir de una lectura semiótico-hermenéutica de la teoría de la imaginación spinozista, la cual permite ver ciertas semejanzas entre las epistemologías de percepción entre estos respectivos filósofos. A la vez, al destacar las convergencias entre Spinoza y Merleau-Ponty, se ponen de relieve las divergencias entre el cartesianismo y la fenomenología, y surge la posibilidad de una lectura novedosa de la fenomenología desde una perspectiva spinozista.

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Must phenomenology remain Cartesian?

Cited by 27 publications

References 10 publications

Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

Phenomenologists on Perception and Hallucination: Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty

La fenomenología de la percepción en Spinoza

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