Mutual Funds and Information Diffusion: The Role of Country-Level Governance

Abstract

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The Asset Growth Effect and Investor Protection in Emerging Markets: The Role of the Global Financial Crisis

“…This finding implies that investors can use the information contained in country-level governance indicators to construct profitable portfolio strategies in countries with poor quality governance. Lin, Massa, and Zhang (2014) examine the relation between country-level governance and the process incorporation of information into stock markets, namely the stock price informativeness. Semi-public information is referred to as superior information that is obtained from informed judgments or better skills at processing public information.…”

“…Lin, Massa, and Zhang (2014) look at how the quality of country governance affects investors processing information, which leads to price informativeness. Their results reveal better price informativeness in countries with poor quality of country-level governance because public information is less reliable in those countries and market participants, such as asset managers and analysts ensure price informativeness efficiently.…”

Second‐order effects of CEO characteristics: How rivals' perceptions of CEOs as submissive and provocative precipitate competitive attacks

“…We combine videometric measures of CEOs with data drawn from RavenPack News Analytics. RavenPack uses a patented algorithm to classify and aggregate press releases which is commonly used to capture firms' competitive actions (e.g., Connelly, Tihanyi, Ketchen, Carnes, & Ferrier, ; Lin, Massa, & Zhang, ; Twedt, ). Researchers have long employed press releases and news articles to manually code firms' competitive actions (e.g., Smith et al, ; Upson, Ketchen, Connelly, & Ranft, ).…”

Do Foreign Investors Improve Market Efficiency?

“…Using a sample of 3,189 global firms in 2002, He et al (2013) show a positive relation between large foreign block shareholdings and stock price informativeness (PIN and return nonsynchronicity). Lin, Massa and Zhang (2014) investigate the role of country-level governance in information processing by mutual funds. Using similar data, Bena et al (2017) find that greater foreign institutional ownership fosters long-term investment and innovation output.…”