My Traces Learn What You Did in the Dark: Recovering Secret Signals Without Key Guesses

Gao, Si; Chen, Hua; Wu, Wenling; Fan, Li; Cao, Weiqiong; Ma, Xinwen

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-52153-4_21

Cited by 3 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In this paper, we focus on Boolean masking, the most frequently implemented approach. In a Boolean masking scheme with d-shares, an intermediate state x is split into d shares x (1) , x (2) , ..., x (d) where…”

Section: Masking Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For linear components P , implementing a Boolean masking is quite straightforward: as P (x (1) (1) ) ⊕ P (x (2) ) ⊕ ... ⊕ P (x (d) ), simply applying P to all d shares gives the expected outputs. For non-linear components (Sboxes), things become tricker.…”

Section: Masking Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For non-linear components (Sboxes), things become tricker. In order to ensure the output shares satisfy S(x (1)…”

Section: Masking Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In many look-up table schemes, the masked Sbox is computed as a look-up table [7,8,9]. In the first step, these schemes often generate a masked table using all the shares from x (1) to x (d−1) . Then, the output shares y (1) , y (2) , ..., y (d) can be found by simply looking up x (d) in the masked table.…”

Section: Masking Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In 2017, Gao et al proposed a new non-profiled SCA based on Independent Component Analysis (ICA) [1]. Assuming the observed leakages follow the weighted Hamming weight model, the ICA based attack recovers the intermediate states without making any explicit key guesses.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Non-profiled Mask Recovery: The Impact of Independent Component Analysis

Gao

Oswald²,

Chen

et al. 2019

Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications

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As one of the most prevalent SCA countermeasures, masking schemes are designed to defeat a broad range of side channel attacks. An attack vector that is suitable for low-order masking schemes is to try and directly determine the mask(s) (for each trace) by utilising the fact that often an attacker has access to several leakage points of the respectively used mask(s). Good examples for implementations of loworder masking schemes are the based on table re-computations and also the masking scheme in DPAContest V4.2. We propose a novel approach based on Independent Component Analysis (ICA) to efficiently utilise the information from several leakage points to reconstruct the respective masks (for each trace) and show it is a competitive attack vector in practice.

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Section: Masking Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Masking Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For non-linear components (Sboxes), things become tricker. In order to ensure the output shares satisfy S(x (1)…”

Section: Masking Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Masking Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Non-profiled Mask Recovery: The Impact of Independent Component Analysis

Gao

Oswald²,

Chen

et al. 2019

Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications

Self Cite

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On the Use of Independent Component Analysis to Denoise Side-Channel Measurements

Maghrebi¹,

Prouff

2018

Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

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Independent Component Analysis (ICA) is a powerful technique for blind source separation. It has been successfully applied to signal processing problems, such as feature extraction and noise reduction, in many different areas including medical signal processing and telecommunication. In this work, we propose a framework to apply ICA to denoise side-channel measurements and hence to reduce the complexity of key recovery attacks. Based on several case studies, we afterwards demonstrate the overwhelming advantages of ICA with respect to the commonly used preprocessing techniques such as the singular spectrum analysis. Mainly, we target a software masked implementation of an AES and a hardware unprotected one. Our results show a significant Signalto-Noise Ratio (SNR) gain which translates into a gain in the number of traces needed for a successful side-channel attack. This states the ICA as an important new tool for the security assessment of cryptographic implementations.

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