Naive Cronyism and Neutral Competence: Patronage, Performance, and Policy Agreement in Executive Appointments

Abstract

Much of the bureaucratic literature suggests that, when staffing the bureaucracy, executives want agents who are both responsive to their political needs and possess the competence needed to fulfill their directives. However, institutional barriers-such as the requirement for legislative confirmation-exist that may make pursuing a strategy of responsive competence difficult, if not impossible. Here, I examine a model of bureaucratic appointments that allows for informationally imperfect agencies. I show that when legislative assent is required, trade-offs between ideology and either patronage or agency performance-or both-are often required to ensure legislative confirmation. The same dynamics are not present for unilateral appointments. Finally, using a data set that incorporates the ideologies of federal program managers, the performance of federal programs, and whether program managers were patronage appointees, I conduct a series of empirical tests that support the model's predictions.

Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents

“…A low-ability agent cannot make a wise choice, and therefore, any bias in the decisions by a low-ability agent is less costly to the principal than a bias by a high-ability agent. Hollibaugh (2015) argues that low-ability agents will be placed in underperforming agencies, consistent with the implications of our model. Lewis (2007Lewis ( , 2009 argues that patronage appointees, who may often be of lower ability, are easiest to place in agencies that share the president's view about policy.…”

The Political Determinants of Ambassadorial Appointments

“…Previous studies of executive appointments (e.g., Hollibaugh 2015aHollibaugh , 2015bHollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014;Lewis 2007;Lewis 2008;Parsneau 2008) have argued that when making executive appointments, presidents are forced to make trade-offs between policy goals and political goals, a line of thought that extends at least as far back as Wilson's (1887) theory of the politics-administration dichotomy. Indeed, while patronage appointments "provide a means for presidents to hold supporters in line : : : and accomplish their policy goals" (Lewis 2008, 208), agencies run by appointees with connections to the president's party or campaign (i.e., those most likely to have been patronage appointees) tend to perform worse than agencies run by other types of appointees, suggesting patronage is one possible method by which bureaucratic incompetence arises (Gallo and Lewis 2012;Hollibaugh 2015b;Lewis 2007).…”

“…Indeed, while patronage appointments "provide a means for presidents to hold supporters in line : : : and accomplish their policy goals" (Lewis 2008, 208), agencies run by appointees with connections to the president's party or campaign (i.e., those most likely to have been patronage appointees) tend to perform worse than agencies run by other types of appointees, suggesting patronage is one possible method by which bureaucratic incompetence arises (Gallo and Lewis 2012;Hollibaugh 2015b;Lewis 2007). 9 Conceivably, the same dynamic might hold in embassies, if for no other reason than the fact that nonprofessional ambassadors are less likely to have prior diplomatic experience and are likely less familiar with the day-to-day workings of embassies.…”

“…While there exists little research on the determinants of nonprofessional ambassadors per se (but see Fedderke and Jett 2015; also see Flynn 2014 for a discussion of the importance of domestic factors with respect to appointments to the foreign policy bureaucracy more generally), there exists a rather large body of research on the qualifications and backgrounds of executive agency appointees (e.g., Cohen 1998;Edwards 2001;Heclo 1977;Hollibaugh 2015aHollibaugh , 2015bHollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014;Krause and O'Connell 2015;Lewis 2008Lewis , 2009). Previous research on agency appointments has with-ambassador-posts.html (accessed April 18, 2015); Jonathan Weisman and Yuka Hayashi, "Donors Find a Home in Obama's Ambassador Corps," Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB124658149328689699.html (accessed April 18, 2015).…”

“…White areas represent areas for which no data are available. suggested nonprofessional appointments are most likely when an agency is not a particularly high priority to the president, when an agency's mission is ideologically aligned with the policies of the president, when individual appointments have little influence on agency outcomes, and when the benefits of agency expertise are particularly low (Hollibaugh 2015b;Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014;Lewis 2008Lewis , 2009. That said, because of their prominence, international character, and frequent use for patronage purposes, it is unknown whether ambassadorial appointments are governed by the same dynamics.…”