The Political Determinants of Ambassadorial Appointments

Abstract

Media accounts of presidential appointments have often characterized the ambassadorial appointments process as overtaken by patronage concerns, with the most attractive posts set aside for those responsible for the president's election, few of whom have diplomatic experience. Here, using original data on all ambassadors, envoys, and other chiefs of mission appointed during the 68th through 112th Congresses, I leverage the credentialing process of the Foreign Service to conduct an empirical test of the determinants of professional versus nonprofessional appointments. I find that Foreign Service appointments are more likely when there exists significant ideological distance between the appointing president and the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when the difficulty of the posting is high, and when the attractiveness of the posting is low.

Striped Pants versus Fat Cats: Ambassadorial Performance of Career Diplomats and Political Appointees

“…An initial study buttresses the conventional wisdom by showing that political appointees typically receive postings in high‐income, high‐tourism western European capitals such as London (Fedderke and Jett ). Hollibaugh () develops and then empirically tests a formal theory to explain presidential selection of ambassadors by incorporating expectations of policy and patronage benefit along with a penalty in policy for less competent appointees; the analyses and results go beyond Fedderke and Jett's () findings to highlight how both domestic and foreign political factors influence presidential choices.…”

“…But neither the expansive literature on Senate confirmation nor the expanding performance literature address what happens after the nomination and confirmation of ambassadors—even though they are highly visible in policy and political debates. As Hollibaugh () articulates but much of the general commentary glosses over, there is significant variation between careerists and appointees both within individual ambassadorships and across the class as a whole. Yet we do not have systematic data on this variation; for example, how many political appointees—or, perhaps more interestingly, careerists—have language skills or experience in the countries to which they are sent?…”

The When and Why of Nominations

“…For example, when the President and the Senate are at ideological or partisan odds, both executive and judicial nominees tend to endure longer confirmation periods and are more likely to be rejected (Asmussen, 2011;Bailey, 2007;Bell, 2002;Hartley & Holmes, 2002;Hollibaugh, 2015c;Jo, Forthcoming;McCarty & Razaghian, 1999;Shipan & Shannon, 2003). 1 Additionally, both the executive and judicial literatures have found that competent nominees experience greater confirmation probabilities and shorter delays (Basinger & Mak, 2010;Cameron, Cover, & Segal, 1990;Epstein, Lindstädt, Segal, & Westerland, 2006;Hollibaugh, 2015bHollibaugh, , 2015cShipan & Shannon, 2003; but see Lott, 2005, for a contrary claim). The importance of executive positions is also relevant, as nominees to the most important offices tend to be confirmed more quickly (Aberbach & Rockman, 2009;Chiou & Rothenberg, 2014;Krutz, Fleisher, & Bond, 1998;McCarty & Razaghian, 1999).…”

Presidential Appointments and Public Trust

“… An ambassadorial appointment was chosen because ambassadorships are frequently used to satisfy patronage concerns (Hollibaugh ). Chile in particular was chosen because 40% of ambassadorships during the 68th through 112th Congresses were nonprofessional, ensuring the credibility of a fictional nomination of either type.…”