Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily

Abstract

Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that there is a robust form of naive realism which is unfazed by the blurriness of some of our experiences, even when that blurriness is understood as a subjective modification of consciousness.

Rethinking naive realism

“…28, 51) suggests that those can account for the phenomenology of perceiving watchfully or steadily. Similarly, French (2014) suggests that the perceiving relation can have features that account for the phenomenology of perceiving blurrily. Brewer (2011, p. 116) holds that the perceiving relation might be degraded-a feature of the relation which he takes to account for the visual phenomenology enjoyed by a red/green color-blind subject when she visually perceives an apple.…”

“…I am very grateful to the reviewer for both these suggestions. For a further discussion of blurry vision in a naive realist setting, see French (2014).…”

Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

“…the standpoint, whose intended role is to modify how the object is perceived (Campbell : 51). French's (: 400) characterisation of Campbell's standpoint as selectional is thus not wholly accurate. It would be more accurate to say that standpoints, on Campbell's view, play both a selectional and presentational role in perception, whether or not Campbell recognises it.…”

Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity

“…Visual blur is often posed as a problem for the transparency thesis. For more discussion on blur, see Smith (), Allen (), French (), Schroer (), and Speaks (, ). For other recent challenges to the transparency thesis, see Kind (2003) and Howell ().…”