2002
DOI: 10.1023/a:1016056327692
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Nash Equilibria, Variational Inequalities, and Dynamical Systems

Abstract: In this paper we introduce some relationships between Nash equilibria, variational equilibria and dynamical equilibria for noncooperative games.

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Cited by 82 publications
(53 citation statements)
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“…formulated the Cournot Nash game as a differential variational inequality to solve a network oligopolistic competition problem in a supply chain. The quasi-variational inequality approach, developed by Cavazzuti et al (2002) and Pang (2002), dealt with joint constraints. Adida and Perakis (2006) and Adida and Perakis (2010) showed the existence and uniqueness of generalized Nash equilibrium based on Pang (2002) and then used robust optimization to address demand uncertainty.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…formulated the Cournot Nash game as a differential variational inequality to solve a network oligopolistic competition problem in a supply chain. The quasi-variational inequality approach, developed by Cavazzuti et al (2002) and Pang (2002), dealt with joint constraints. Adida and Perakis (2006) and Adida and Perakis (2010) showed the existence and uniqueness of generalized Nash equilibrium based on Pang (2002) and then used robust optimization to address demand uncertainty.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Each IaaS, in turn, wants to maximize the revenues obtained providing the resources. To capture the behavior of SaaSs and IaaSs in this conflicting situation, in which the best choice for one depends on the choices of the others, we model such problem as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP), in which both the objective function and the feasible region of each player depend on the strategies chosen by the other players (see, e.g., [23], [27], [29], [56]). Then, we propose a distributed algorithm which converges to a Generalized Nash Equilibrium after a finite number of iterations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To capture the behavior of SaaSs and IaaSs in this conflicting situation, in which the best choice for one depends on the choices of the others, we recur to the Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) concept (see e.g., (Bigi et al 2013, Cavazzuti et al 2002, Debreu 1952, Facchinei and Kanzow 2010a, Rosen 1965). GNE is an extension of the Nash equilibrium, in which not only the objective function but also the feasible region of each player depend on the strategies chosen by the other players.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%