Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces

Naeve, Jörg

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00185-2

Cited by 17 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…We show that if the disagreement point is not state dependent the Nash Bargaining solution is implementable with a non-rewarding renegotiation function (Proposition 4). This agrees with the findings of Serrano (1997) and Naeve (1999).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach

Triossi

Corchón

2006

SSRN Journal

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In this paper we present a model of implementation when the feasible set and preferences are state dependent based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for unfeasibilities. * We thank Carmen Beviá for very useful comments. The paper was presented in the III Workshop of Social Choice held in Malaga, June 2005. We are indebted to the audience for very useful comments, specially to Asher Wolinski. We acknowledge financial support from CAICYT under project PB BEC2002-02194 and from Fundación BBVA.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach

Triossi

Corchón

2006

SSRN Journal

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“…We show that the Nash Bargaining solution can be implemented if the disagreement point is not state dependent (Proposition 4). This agrees with the findings obtained by Serrano and Vohra (1997) and Naeve (1999) in a different framework. We also show that the KalaiSmorodinski solution is not implementable.…”

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confidence: 93%

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

Corchón

Triossi

2010

Soc Choice Welf

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In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and taxation.

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“…Howard (1992) argues that, due to a lack of Maskin monotonicity, the Nash bargaining solution fails to be Nash implementable. That a suitably defined Nash bargaining social choice rule is in fact Nash implementable has been demonstrated by von Damme (1986), Naeve (1999), and Trockel (2000Trockel ( , 2002b.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

Haake

Trockel

2008

Rev Econ Design

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Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a stronger version of monotonicity that is even sufficient for Nash implementability.JEL Classification: C71; C78; D61

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Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces

Cited by 17 publications

References 8 publications

Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach

Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

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