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An individual who has to choose one item from an opportunity set or menu may lack complete information about the ®nal consequences attached to her choice. This problem has been modeled by Bossert (2000) who introduces an axiomatic approach to the ranking of menus according to their informational content. We propose a di¨erent ranking based on the lexicographic ordering on the vectors of numbers of consequences for each item and characterize it axiomatically.

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In this note we study the relevance of using contingent commodity allocations when states are not directly contractible. In such a setting, a contingent commodity allocation takes the form of a social choice function, and the question is whether this function is implementable. Using only very mild assumptions on the rule for selecting contingent commodity allocations, we derive a strong negative result which proves to be robust with respect to different solution concepts employed for implementation. These findings have interesting implications for the interpretation of Arrow-Debreu economies.

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