2014
DOI: 10.3386/w20641
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“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work

Abstract: A "Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains" has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms' marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to "Nash-in-… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…This is not the case in many strategy contexts (de Fontenay and Gans, , ). Also, some recent industrial organization papers doing structural estimation of vertical relations use the Nash bargaining solution for the CGT stage (Collard‐Wexler, Gowrisankaran, and Lee, ). This also poses difficulties for dealing with competitive externalities (that arise when competing firms are prevented, say by antitrust laws, from negotiating directly with one another), but it has proven to be tractable for the study of vertical relations when downstream firms operate in distinct markets.…”
Section: Comparison To Other Modeling Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is not the case in many strategy contexts (de Fontenay and Gans, , ). Also, some recent industrial organization papers doing structural estimation of vertical relations use the Nash bargaining solution for the CGT stage (Collard‐Wexler, Gowrisankaran, and Lee, ). This also poses difficulties for dealing with competitive externalities (that arise when competing firms are prevented, say by antitrust laws, from negotiating directly with one another), but it has proven to be tractable for the study of vertical relations when downstream firms operate in distinct markets.…”
Section: Comparison To Other Modeling Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This setup matches the structure studied by Collard-Wexler, Gowrisankaran, and Lee (2018), with the exception that we assume firms bargain over linear fees as opposed to lump-sum transfers.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To focus on vertical agreements, we rule out any kind of "horizontal" mechanisms such as, e.g., loyalty rebates or Most Favored Nation provisions, 10 and consider instead contracts purely based on the quantity traded: Formally, a contract between M i and R h is a tari¤ ih : < + ! <, where ih (q) is the payment from R h to M i in return for a quantity q of good i.…”
Section: The Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%