National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement

Abstract

Some fifteen years after the collapse of communism, the uniting of Western and Eastern Europe through a substantial enlargement of the EU is perhaps the most important single policy instrument available to further a more stable and prosperous continent. Eight postcommunist states have concluded negotiations with the EU for full membership in 2002, and several more are poised to do so later. In this article, we seek to outline in the very broadest strokes the most important structural forces of national interest and influence underlying the dynamics of enlargement itself and its future consequences for EU governance. We do not claim our analysis is comprehensive, only that it seeks to capture the most significant of the underlying forces in play.The apparent success of enlargement and the terms on which it is taking place have surprised many analysts and aroused many critics. Most commentators treat enlargement as a radical break in the history of the EU. They find the prospect of enlargement itself mystifying and invoke idealistic motivations on the part of European governments to explain it. At the same time, many criticize the EU for taking too long to enlarge and for imposing burdensome conditions on the candidates. Still others fear that enlarge-42

Gradualism and uncertainty in international union formation: The European Community’s first enlargement

“…For example, the strategic calculus and cost-benefit analysis inherent in the Southern and Eastern expansions of the European Community was much more clear-cut compared to its first enlargement. This helps explain why the strict conditionality clauses imposed on the most recent accession countries appeared as unduly harsh and discriminatory, even though these countries were much better off joining the EU than staying out (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003). One could thus provide a theoretical account of the gradual shift in the EU enlargement process from open-ended accession negotiations (as evidenced in the earlier waves of enlargement) to the more rigorous application of the conditionality principle (most notable in the recent expansion from 15 to 27 and increasingly applied in ongoing accession negotiations with candidate-members).…”

Entrapment, Economics, and Geopolitics: The Obstacles and Conditions for Turkish EU Membership

“…The Netherlands, which had the most to gain from a customs union and was the least willing to forego ratification, actually had to make the most concessions of any European country. France on the other hand, as a larger and more self-sufficient economy, was much more capable of going at it alone (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003). Whereas the lack of a customs union would be a severe blow to the Netherlands, for France it would be only a minor setback.…”

“…Their description of this model, which builds on the work of Nye and Keohane, illustrates how in a bargaining situation the nation which will benefit the most from the bargain will have to make the largest concession. Conversely the nation which has the least to gain from the agreement will have to give up the least because they have less anxiety about forgoing the more modest gains of cooperation (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003).…”

Untitled

“…Although the beginning was difficult, the EU became the most important means for providing prosperity on the continent, especially after the fifth and the greatest enlargement during which many Eastern European countries joined the agreement some 15 years after the collapse of communism. This unification is therefore considered the most radical break that ever occurred in the history of the EU [Moravcsik, Vachudova, 2002]. In 2004, the EU welcomed 10 new countries, most of them from Central and Eastern Europe to join the EU (Cyprus, Malta, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) [Zeff, 2006].…”